United Nations S/2011/769

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 December 2011

Original: English

United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements by its President on the situation in Liberia and West Africa,

Welcoming the sustained progress made by the Government of Liberia since January 2006, in rebuilding Liberia for the benefit of all Liberians, with the support of the international community,

Stressing that Liberia's progress in the timber sector must continue with the effective implementation and enforcement of the National Forestry Reform Law signed into law on 5 October 2006, and other new legislation related to revenue transparency (the Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act) and resolution of land and tenure rights (Community Rights Law with respect to Forest Lands and Lands Commission Act),

Encouraging the Government of Liberia to reaffirm its commitment and redouble its efforts to ensure the effective implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in Liberia and to take all possible measures to prevent rough diamond smuggling,

Encouraging the Government of Liberia to improve its control over the gold sector and adopt the necessary legislation in this regard, and focus its efforts on establishing effective governance of the gold production sector,

Stressing the continuing importance of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in improving security throughout Liberia and helping the Government establish its authority throughout the country, particularly in the diamond, gold, timber, and other natural resources-producing regions, and border areas,

Taking note of the report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on Liberia (S/2011/757) 757,

Underlining its determination to support the Government of Liberia in its efforts to meet the conditions of resolution 1521 (2003), welcoming the engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission, and encouraging all stakeholders, including donors, to support the Government of Liberia in its efforts,

Acknowledging the implementation of the guidelines of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on cooperation and information sharing between the

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United Nations peacekeeping missions and the Security Council's Sanctions Committees' expert panels,

Commending the people of Liberia on the completion of their presidential election of 8 November, which was free, fair and transparent, and further commending the National Elections Commission's successful organization of the electoral process, in accordance with Liberian law,

Expressing concern about the violent events of 7 November 2011 and *welcoming* the Government of Liberia's establishment of a Special Independent Commission of Inquiry to investigate the events and determine the facts and circumstances through independent and impartial proceedings that meet international standards, in order to hold accountable those responsible,

Calling on all Liberian leaders to promote meaningful reconciliation and inclusive dialogue to consolidate peace and advance Liberia's democratic development,

Determining that, despite significant progress, the situation in Liberia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1532 (2004) remain in force, *notes with serious concern* the lack of progress with regards to the implementation of the financial measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1532 (2004), and *demands* that the Government of Liberia make all necessary efforts to fulfil its obligations;

2. *Decides* for a period of 12 months from the date of adoption of this resolution:

(a) To renew the measures on travel imposed by paragraph 4 of resolution 1521 (2003);

(b) To renew the measures on arms, previously imposed by paragraph 2 of resolution 1521 (2003) and modified by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1683 (2006), by paragraph 1 (b) of resolution 1731 (2006), by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of resolution 1903 (2009), and by paragraph 3 of resolution 1961 (2010);

(c) To review the measures in this paragraph and in paragraph 1 above in light of the progress achieved in the stabilization throughout the country and the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections, with a view to possibly modifying or lifting all or part of the measures of the sanctions regime, and that such a review shall be carried out at the end of the above-mentioned 12-month period, with a midterm review no later than 30 April 2012;

3. *Decides further* to review any of the above measures at the request of the Government of Liberia, once the Government reports to the Council that the conditions set out in resolution 1521 (2003) for terminating the measures have been met, and provides the Council with information to justify its assessment;

4. *Directs* the Committee, in coordination with the Government of Liberia and relevant designating States and with the assistance of the Panel of Experts, to, as necessary and without delay, update the publicly available reasons for listing for

entries on the travel ban and assets freeze lists as well as the Committee's guidelines;

5. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 1903 (2009) for a period of 12 months from the date of adoption of this resolution to undertake the following tasks:

(a) To conduct two follow-up assessment missions to Liberia and neighbouring States, in order to investigate and compile a midterm and a final report on the implementation, and any violations, of the measures on arms as amended by resolution 1903 (2009), including any information relevant to the designation by the Committee of the individuals described in paragraph 4 (a) of resolution 1521 (2003) and paragraph 1 of resolution 1532 (2004), and including the various sources of financing, such as from natural resources, for the illicit trade of arms;

(b) To assess the impact, effectiveness, and continued need for the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 1532 (2004), including particularly with respect to the assets of former President Charles Taylor;

(c) To identify and make recommendations regarding areas where the capacity of Liberia and the States in the region can be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 of resolution 1521 (2003) and paragraph 1 of resolution 1532 (2004);

(d) Within the context of Liberia's evolving legal framework, assess the extent to which forests and other natural resources are contributing to peace, security and development rather than to instability and to what extent relevant legislation (National Forestry Reform Law, Lands Commission Act, Community Rights Law with respect to Forest Land, and Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act) and other reform efforts are contributing to this transition, and to provide recommendations on how such natural resources could better contribute to the country's progress towards sustainable peace and stability;

(e) To cooperate actively with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and to assess the Government of Liberia's compliance with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme;

(f) To provide a midterm report to the Council through the Committee by 1 June 2012 and a final report to the Council through the Committee by 1 December 2012 on all the issues listed in this paragraph, and to provide informal updates to the Committee as appropriate before those dates, especially on progress in the forest sector since the lifting of paragraph 10 of resolution 1521 (2003) in June 2006, and in the diamond sector since the lifting of paragraph 6 of resolution 1521 (2003) in April 2007;

(g) To cooperate actively with other relevant panels of experts, in particular that on Côte d'Ivoire re-established by paragraph 13 of resolution 1980 (2011) and that on the Democratic Republic of the Congo re-established by paragraph 4 of resolution 2021 (2011) with respect to natural resources;

(h) To assist the Committee in updating the publicly available reasons for listing for entries on the travel ban and assets freeze lists;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to reappoint the Panel of Experts and to make the necessary financial and security arrangements to support the work of the Panel;

7. *Calls upon* all States and the Government of Liberia to cooperate fully with the Panel of Experts in all aspects of its mandate;

8. *Recalls* that responsibility for controlling the circulation of small arms within the territory of Liberia and between Liberia and neighbouring States rests with the relevant governmental authorities in accordance with the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons of 2006;

9. *Reaffirms* the need for UNMIL and the United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) to regularly coordinate their strategies and operations in areas near the Liberian-Côte d'Ivoire border, in order to contribute to subregional security;

10. *Reiterates* the importance of UNMIL's continuing assistance to the Government of Liberia, the Committee, and the Panel of Experts, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, and without prejudice to its mandate, continue to carry out its tasks set forth in previous resolutions, including resolution 1683 (2006);

11. *Urges* the Government of Liberia to complete implementation of the recommendations of the 2009 Kimberley Process review team to strengthen internal controls over diamond mining and exports;

12. *Encourages* the Kimberley Process to continue to cooperate with the Panel of Experts and to report on developments regarding Liberia's implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme;

13. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2011/770

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 December 2011

Original: English

France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and its presidential statements on the situation in Sudan and South Sudan, including resolution 1990 (2011), by which the Security Council established the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA),

Reaffirming its commitment to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity; and to peace, stability and security throughout the region,

Commending the assistance provided to the parties by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and its Chair President Thabo Mbeki, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Haile Menkerios, and Head of Mission for the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede Tesfay,

Welcoming the 29 June Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan on Border Security and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, *taking note* of the commitment in paragraph 2 to create a safe demilitarized border zone (SDBZ) and *further taking note* of the request for assistance from the United Nations to provide external support for monitoring and verification in the SDBZ,

Welcoming the 30 July Agreement on the Border Monitoring Support Mission between the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan, which elaborates on the establishment of a Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) with an area of responsibility corresponding to the SDBZ, and a Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM), and *taking note* of the request by the parties for the assistance of the United Nations to support the operational activities of the JBVMM,

Underlining the importance of building mutual trust, confidence and an environment which encourages long-term stability and economic development,

Recognizing the urgent need for Sudan and South Sudan to commence the process of border normalization, and recognizing further that the situation along the border between Sudan and South Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

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1. *Decides* that in addition to the tasks set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1990, UNISFA's mandate shall include the following additional tasks in support of the JBVMM; these additional tasks shall be carried out by UNISFA within its authorized capabilities and within an expanded operational area to include the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, JBVMM headquarters, sector headquarters and team sites:

(a) Assist the parties in ensuring the observance within the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone of the security commitments agreed upon by them in the above-mentioned 29 June and 30 July Agreements;

(b) Support the operational activities of the JBVMM, including its sectors and teams, in undertaking verifications, investigations, monitoring, arbitrations, liaison coordinating, reporting, information exchange, patrols, and by providing security as appropriate;

(c) Assist and advise the JBVMM in its overall coordination of planning monitoring and verification of the implementation of the Joint Position Paper on Border Security of 30 May 2011;

(d) Assist the JBVMM to maintain the necessary chart, geographical and mapping references, which shall be used for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of paragraph 2 of the Agreement on Border Security and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism of 29 June 2011;

(e) Facilitate liaison between the parties;

(f) Support the parties, when requested, in developing effective bilateral management mechanisms along the border;

(g) Assist in building mutual trust;

2. *Requests* the Governments of South Sudan and Sudan to implement fully their commitments under the above referenced 29 June and 30 July Agreements;

3. *Calls on* all Member States, in particular Sudan and South Sudan, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Abyei and throughout the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles, aircraft and spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of UNISFA;

4. *Urges* the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan to cooperate fully with each other and provide full support to UNISFA, enabling it to implement fully its mandate;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed of progress in implementing the additional tasks listed in paragraph 1 of this resolution in his regular reports to the Council on the implementation of the UNISFA mandate, to bring to the Council's immediate attention any serious violations of the above referenced agreements, and to look for and implement ways to strengthen inter-mission cooperation within the region;

6. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2011/771

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 December 2011

Original: English

China, France, Russian Federation United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General of 30 November 2011 (S/2011/746) on the United Nations operation in Cyprus,

Noting that the Government of Cyprus is agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions on the island it is necessary to keep the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) beyond 15 December 2011,

Echoing the Secretary-General's firm belief that the responsibility for finding a solution lies first and foremost with the Cypriots themselves, and *reaffirming* the primary role of the United Nations in assisting the parties to bring the Cyprus conflict and division of the island to a comprehensive and durable settlement,

Welcoming the progress made so far in the fully fledged negotiations, and the leaders' joint statements including those of 23 May and 1 July 2008,

Welcoming the move towards a more intensive phase of negotiations, *stressing* that the status quo is unsustainable and *strongly urging* the leaders to increase the momentum in the negotiations, particularly on the core issues, to reach an enduring, comprehensive and just settlement based on a bicommunal, bizonal federation with political equality, as set out in the relevant Security Council resolutions,

Emphasizing the importance attached by the international community of all parties engaging fully, flexibly and constructively in the negotiations, *echoing* the Secretary-General's view that a comprehensive settlement can be achieved, *looking forward* to decisive progress in the near future, leading up to the Secretary-General's meeting with the leaders in January 2012, and *echoing* the Secretary-General's expectation that "all internal aspects of a settlement will have been resolved by then so that we can move to a multilateral conference shortly thereafter" with the consent of the two sides,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to stimulate progress during his meeting with the two leaders on 31 October 2011, his intention to meet with the two leaders in January 2012, and *noting* his intention to submit to the Security Council in January 2012 an updated assessment on the state of the process,

Noting the need to advance the consideration of and discussions on military confidence-building measures, *calling for* renewed efforts to implement all remaining

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confidence-building measures, and for agreement on and implementation of further steps to build trust between the communities,

Reaffirming the importance of continued crossings of the Green Line by Cypriots, and *encouraging* the opening by mutual agreement of other crossing points,

Convinced of the many important benefits for all Cypriots that would flow from a comprehensive and durable Cyprus settlement, *urging* the two sides and their leaders to foster positive public rhetoric, and *encouraging* them clearly to explain the benefits of the settlement, as well as the need for increased flexibility and compromise in order to secure it, to both communities well in advance of any eventual referenda,

Considering that undermining the United Nation's credibility undermines the peace process itself,

Highlighting the importance of the supporting role of the international community, and in particular that of the parties concerned in taking practical steps towards helping the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to exploit fully the current opportunity,

Taking note of the assessment of the Secretary-General that the security situation on the island and along the Green Line remains stable, and *urging* all sides to avoid any action which could lead to an increase in tension, undermine the progress achieved so far, or damage the goodwill on the island,

Recalling the Secretary-General's firm belief that the situation in the buffer zone would be improved if both sides accepted the 1989 aide-memoire used by the United Nations,

Noting with regret that the sides are withholding access to the remaining minefields in the buffer zone, and that demining in Cyprus has ceased as a result, noting the continued danger posed by mines in Cyprus, and *urging* rapid agreement on facilitating the recommencement of demining operations and clearance of the remaining minefields,

Highlighting the importance of the activities of the Committee on Missing Persons, *urging* the opening up of access to all areas to allow the Committee to carry out their work, and *trusting* that this process will promote reconciliation between the communities,

Agreeing that active participation of civil society groups, including women's groups, is essential to the political process and can contribute to making any future settlement sustainable, *recalling* that women play an important role in peace processes, *welcoming* all efforts to promote bicommunal contacts and events including, inter alia, on the part of all United Nations bodies on the island, and *urging* the two sides to promote the active engagement of civil society and the encouragement of cooperation between economic and commercial bodies and to remove all obstacles to such contacts,

Stressing the need for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

Welcoming the intention of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including those of UNFICYP, under close review and *noting* the

importance of contingency planning in relation to the settlement, including recommendations as appropriate for further adjustments to UNFICYP's mandate, force levels and other resources and concept of operations, taking into account developments on the ground, and the views of the parties,

Welcoming also the continued efforts of Alexander Downer as the Secretary-General's Special Advisor with a mandate to assist the parties in the conduct of fully-fledged negotiations aimed at reaching a comprehensive settlement, and the efforts of Lisa Buttenheim as the Secretary-General's Special Representative,

Echoing the Secretary-General's gratitude to the Government of Cyprus and the Government of Greece for their voluntary contributions to the funding of UNFICYP, and his request for further voluntary contributions from other countries and organizations, and *expressing* appreciation to member States that contribute personnel to UNFICYP,

Welcoming and *encouraging* efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,

1. *Welcomes* the encouraging progress made so far in the fully fledged negotiations, and the prospect of further decisive progress in the coming months towards a comprehensive and durable settlement that this has created;

2. *Takes note of* the report of the Secretary-General (S/2011/498);

3. *Recalls* Security Council resolution 1986 (2011), and *calls upon* the two leaders to:

(a) intensify the momentum of negotiations, engage in the process in a constructive and open manner, and work on reaching convergences on the remaining core issues in preparation for their meeting with the Secretary-General in January 2012, and for further work in the following months towards a settlement;

(b) improve the public atmosphere in which the negotiations are proceeding, including by focusing public messages on convergences and the way ahead, and delivering more constructive and harmonized messages; and

(c) increase the participation of civil society in the process as appropriate;

4. *Urges* the implementation of confidence-building measures, and *looks forward* to agreement on and implementation of further such steps, including military confidence-building measures and the opening of other crossing points;

5. *Urges* all parties to be more forthcoming in accommodating the Committee for Missing Persons exhumation requirements throughout the island including in military areas in the north;

6. *Reaffirms* all its relevant resolutions on Cyprus, in particular resolution 1251 (1999) of 29 June 1999 and subsequent resolutions;

7. *Expresses* its full support for UNFICYP and *decides* to extend its mandate for a further period ending 19 July 2012;

8. *Calls* on both sides to continue to engage, as a matter of urgency and while respecting UNFICYP's mandate, in consultations with UNFICYP on the

demarcation of the buffer zone, and on the United Nations 1989 aide-memoire, with a view to reaching early agreement on outstanding issues;

9. *Calls* on the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkish forces to restore in Strovilia the military status quo which existed there prior to 30 June 2000;

10. *Calls* on both sides to allow access to deminers and to facilitate the removal of the remaining mines in Cyprus within the buffer zone, and *urges* both sides to extend demining operations outside the buffer zone;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on implementation of this resolution, including on contingency planning in relation to the settlement, by 1 July 2012 and to keep the Security Council updated on events as necessary;

12. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNFICYP to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, *requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and *urges* troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including the conduct of predeployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

13. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations A/66/604–S/2011/772

General Assembly
Security Council

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13 December 2011

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General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda item 38
The situation in Afghanistan

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

The situation in Afghanistan and its implication for international peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/8 and Security Council resolution 1974 (2011), in which the Council requested me to report on developments in Afghanistan every three months.

2. The report provides an update on the activities of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including significant humanitarian, development and human rights efforts, since my previous report issued on 21 September 2011 (A/66/369-S/2011/590). The report also provides a summary of key political and security developments and regional and international events related to Afghanistan.

II. Relevant developments

A. Political developments

3. The assassination on 20 September of the head of the High Peace Council, Chair of the party Jamiat-i-Islami and former President of Afghanistan, Burhanuddin Rabbani, by a suicide bomber posing as a Taliban peace envoy has had significant political and security implications. Responsibility for the assassination remains unclear, with no formal statement claiming responsibility. There have been calls, including by the National Assembly, for international cooperation in investigating the attack.

4. The culmination of a series of high-profile assassinations of figures formerly part of or close to the Northern Alliance, Mr. Rabbani's death has intensified internal political manoeuvring and weakened trust between factions and ethnic groups. Debate was sparked on key issues, such as the future of the peace process

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and the work of the High Peace Council, relations with Pakistan and the strategic partnership with the United States. Intense political posturing was also observed within Jamiat-i-Islami, a predominantly Tajik network over which Mr. Rabbani, as founder, held some influence.

5. The Head of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme, Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, was severely wounded in the same attack but has now resumed his functions. By the end of October 2011, 2,974 reintegrees had joined the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme, with 28 provincial peace committees established. Mr. Rabbani's death, however, had a dampening effect on the wider reconciliation process.

6. From 16 to 19 November, a Traditional Loya Jirga was convened in Kabul, attended by approximately 2,000 delegates from across the country. It was initially envisioned to discuss the proposed strategic partnership between Afghanistan and the United States, but following Mr. Rabbani's death, its focus was expanded to include consideration of the future of the peace process. At the Traditional Loya Jirga, the mandate of the High Peace Council was reaffirmed and the Government was asked to appoint a new Chair. The gathering also advocated negotiations only with known and legitimate representatives of the insurgency and noted that sincere cooperation by Pakistan was needed for a peace process to succeed.

7. On 3 November, the new Rights and Justice Party was launched in Kabul. A leadership council, rather than a sole Chair, is to be at the helm, with a number of prominent politicians and civil society activists involved, including former Minister of the Interior Hanif Atmar and Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commissioner Sima Samar. On 11 November, the mostly Uzbek Junbesh party entered into a new political coalition, the National Front, with the largely Hazara Hezb-e-Wahdat party, and with several influential individuals from Jamiat-i-Islami party. Jamiat-i-Islami party will decide at an upcoming party conference whether to join the new coalition.

8. The National Assembly is active again, with a quorum reached in the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House of the National Assembly) on 8 October, concluding a year-long, post-electoral disagreement. Members of the Coalition for Support for the Rule of Law returned to the National Assembly after almost five weeks of boycotting parliamentary sessions. On 15 October, the Wolesi Jirga approved a $51 million supplemental budget request to recapitalize the Kabul Bank. It also confirmed the nominees for the Head of the National Directorate of Security, the Head of the Central Bank and a member of the Independent Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution. At least seven acting ministers and three new Supreme Court justices still need to be confirmed.

9. Prior to the convening of the Traditional Loya Jirga, there had been controversy about its legal status and whether it would meet the requirements and exercise the authority of a Loya Jirga as defined in the Constitution. Concerned that it would seek to override the authority of the Wolesi Jirga to ratify or reject international agreements, the National Assembly passed a resolution objecting to the event. President Karzai allayed such concerns in his opening address, explaining that the objective was to seek advice and that any recommendations would be duly submitted to the National Assembly for consideration and decision.

10. The Traditional Loya Jirga supported the intention of the Government to conclude a strategic partnership agreement with the United States based on full respect for the sovereignty of Afghanistan. Its recommendations also echoed President Karzai's reservations, spelled out in his opening address, against night raids and house searches by foreign troops, as well as detention centres outside of Government control. Finally, the gathering assured neighbouring countries, as the President had done, that any foreign military presence in Afghanistan would be allowed to conduct operations only within Afghanistan.

B. Security developments

11. The United Nations continued to monitor security-related events relevant to the work, mobility and safety of civilians across the country, and impacting the delivery of United Nations-mandated activities and programming. In line with seasonal trends, security-related events declined in September (1,754), October (1,509) and November 2011 (1,416), compared to the previous three-month reporting period. The incidence of events was also lower than during the same period in 2010: September (2,284; an unusually high number, partially owing to the parliamentary elections), October (1,790) and November 2010 (1,591). This quarterly trend should be placed in the context of the first 11 months, where, by the end of November, the average monthly number of security-related events for 2011 was 1,995, up 21 per cent compared to the first 11 months of 2010.

12. Armed clashes and events involving improvised explosive devices constituted the majority of such incidents, accounting for nearly 65 per cent of the total in the reporting period. The focus for military and insurgent activities shifted from the south to the south-east of the country, particularly in the provinces of the south-eastern region and Kunar Province in the eastern region. In part this was owing to disruption to insurgent activity in Helmand Province; it also partially reflected locally based insurgent initiatives in border areas.

13. There were 13 suicide attacks in September, 14 in October and 9 in November 2011, of which 9 were complex attacks. Although this is consistent with previous trends, the locations and individuals targeted generated significant publicity. Among the more notable were the attack on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Provincial Reconstruction Team in Panjshir Province, a suicide car bomb attack on ISAF in southern Kabul that killed 13 military and civilian personnel, and a complex suicide attack against an international logistic company contracted by ISAF located alongside the Herat airfield, which caused the temporary closure of the airport. These attacks were also attempts by the insurgency to demonstrate its geographical reach. On 6 December attacks in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, which resulted in the deaths of dozens of Afghan civilians who had gathered to mark religious ceremonies, were strongly condemned by the United Nations. Despite threats, there were few security incidents connected with the Traditional Loya Jirga: on 9 November in Paktya, an attack took place on the District Administrative Council complex where representatives were being selected; and during the gathering itself, two rockets were fired, causing minimal damage in a nearby neighbourhood and slightly injuring one person. Insurgent intimidation through the targeted assassination of high-ranking government officials, members of the security forces and influential local political and religious leaders continued, with the number of assassinations comparable to that of 2010. The focus shifted from the

southern to the south-eastern and eastern regions, which together accounted for over 65 per cent of total assassinations.

14. The most significant event directly impacting United Nations staff was a complex attack carried out in Kandahar on 31 October, in which three United Nations national staff members were killed and two were injured at the compound of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. No other staff members were killed or injured as a result of their work for the organization. However, one national staff member was briefly abducted by insurgents and released unharmed. Nevertheless, the operational environment for humanitarian and development work remained volatile and United Nations national staff and staff working for non-governmental organizations continued to suffer sporadic intimidation from insurgent and criminal elements.

15. After careful consultation with subnational authorities and on the basis of recommendations by the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board, President Karzai approved, with one addition, the list of areas slated for the second phase of transition of security responsibilities to Afghan control, at a National Security Council meeting on 27 November. It is estimated that, once this phase is completed, over half of the population of Afghanistan will live in areas undergoing transition. During the reporting period, no significant deterioration in public order occurred in the areas handed over to Afghan security responsibility as part of the first phase of transition, which began in July 2011. Security incidents in those areas did not show a marked difference from seasonal trends. The Afghan National Security Forces reportedly increased both the number and the level of operations, some of which were conducted unaided, although logistical support by international forces remains an important element in these efforts.

16. At the meeting of the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board on 29 October, the Chair of the Transition Coordination Commission noted that commitments made at the Lisbon Conference were still on track: the phased military withdrawal had begun; the Kabul Process was reinvigorated; and preparations for strategic partnerships were well under way. It is now also broadly acknowledged by the international community that gains in security could be undermined by weak socio-economic development and governance, and that, consequently, there is a need for a balanced approach to security and non-security considerations. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has continued to play an advocacy and facilitation role in promoting and encouraging coherence between ISAF, donors and the Government of Afghanistan in ensuring the centrality of governance, the rule of law and development as integral elements to an enduring security transition.

17. UNAMA also continued to monitor and provide advice on community-based security initiatives, including the Afghan Local Police, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme and other local defence initiatives, which continue to grow. The Afghan Local Police now numbers more than 9,000 in 56 sites sanctioned by the Ministry of the Interior. While these local defence forces have contributed to stability in some areas, the programme remains controversial, given possible fallout linked to issues of human rights abuses and decrease in civilian protection, impunity, vetting, command and control, and the potential re-emergence of ethnically or politically biased militias. UNAMA has engaged with the relevant

authorities on these concerns and on specific allegations, and was advised that efforts to provide strict oversight would be increased.

18. The process of disbanding private security companies and replacing them with a Government-controlled Afghan public protection force is ongoing. A six-month review found a number of issues related to capacity, particularly in terms of managing large-scale security projects in a fiscally and legally competent manner. The Ministry of the Interior has now created a new deputy ministerial position for the Afghan public protection force and, in conjunction with ISAF and international donor support, a special task force will aim at setting up the initiative fully by March 2012, the proposed date for the dissolution of private security companies. The creation of the Afghan public protection force is another indication that the Government of Afghanistan is taking responsibility for security leadership. Due attention needs to be given to ensuring that the replacement of private security companies by the Afghan public protection force does not adversely impact development and aid projects across Afghanistan.

19. On 30 November, members of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board maintained the agreement reached at the Security Standing Committee of 28 June to an increase in the number of the Afghan National Police from 134,000 to 157,000 and the Afghan National Army from 171,600 to 195,000. The related agreement on accelerated efforts to professionalize the police force and on institutional and administrative reforms to the Ministry of the Interior was also maintained.

C. Regional cooperation

20. The Government of Afghanistan continued to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with neighbouring countries and the broader region amid greater interest by regional and international actors on enhancing regional cooperation. The Istanbul Conference for Afghanistan: Security and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia, chaired by Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Ludin with facilitation by Turkey and UNAMA, was held on 2 November, following preparatory meetings in Oslo on 9 October and in Kabul on 22 October. At the Conference the Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan was adopted by 14 participating countries — neighbours, near neighbours and countries in the region — and welcomed and supported by 22 other countries, institutions and organizations present as observers. The Istanbul Process reaffirms general principles of regional cooperation, but also includes a list of specific confidence-building measures for consideration by the countries of the region. The Government of Afghanistan was requested to circulate a concept paper in January 2012 outlining the agenda for a follow-up ministerial-level conference to be held in Kabul in June 2012. It was also asked to chair a preparatory meeting at the technical level in advance of the June conference.

21. Speculation on the responsibility for the death of Mr. Rabbani had a negative impact on Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. A trilateral meeting between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey, held on 1 November, preceding the Istanbul Conference, went some way in addressing the concerns of and rebuilding relations between the two neighbours. It was, among other things, agreed that Afghanistan and Pakistan would establish a mechanism to cooperate in the investigation of Mr. Rabbani's murder.

22. In preparation of an upcoming trilateral summit between the Presidents of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan in Islamabad, the Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the three countries met in Tehran on 16 October 2011. The tenth meeting of the Council of Heads of Government of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member States took place in Saint Petersburg on 7 November 2011. The meeting also included delegations from Afghanistan, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan as observing countries. Positive outcomes included Russia's commitment of $500 million for the Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Trade and Transmission Project, connecting power lines in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

23. On 4 October, President Karzai signed a partnership agreement between Afghanistan and India. The agreement covers political and security cooperation, trade and economic cooperation, capacity development and education, as well as social, cultural and civil society relations. It will be implemented under the framework of a Partnership Council, to be headed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of both countries, which will convene annually.

24. The Afghanistan-Tajikistan "energy bridge" was inaugurated on 27 October. This involves an electric transmission line connecting the Sangtuda hydroelectric power plant in Tajikistan to Baghlan, in Afghanistan. According to the agreement the transmission line will supply electricity to the northern provinces in Afghanistan until 2015. On 29 September, the Afghan Ministry of Commerce and Industries and the Kazakhstan Ministry of Emergency Situations signed an agreement on expanding trade ties between the two countries.

25. Between 21 and 25 October, the Minister of Counter-Narcotics of Afghanistan and the Country Representative of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) visited Turkmenistan and Tajikistan to foster greater regional cooperation on counter-narcotics within the framework of the new UNODC regional programme for Afghanistan and the neighbouring countries.

26. On 15 November, the International Contact Group met in Astana, to shape the agenda for the International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn on the basis of an Afghan vision. On 5 December, in Bonn, the Conference reaffirmed the commitment of the international community to support Afghanistan through transition and the 2015-2024 Transformation Decade, including on economic development and on a peace and reconciliation process in line with agreed principles. Both Afghanistan and the international community agreed to work together to reinvigorate the Kabul Process and their respective commitments for more on-budget international aid and greater Afghan transparency and anti-corruption efforts. The Conference was preceded on 3 December by a civil society meeting, which reaffirmed the centrality of the human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Afghan Constitution.

III. Human rights

27. The protection of civilians remained a major concern throughout the country. From late August to the end of November, UNAMA documented 795 civilian deaths and 1,083 civilian injuries. While the number of civilians injured decreased by 19 per cent, compared to the same three-month period in 2010, the total number of civilian deaths increased by 5 per cent during the reporting period. Anti-Government

elements caused 1,432 civilian casualties (609 civilian deaths and 823 civilian injuries), representing 77 per cent of all civilian deaths for the reporting period, an increase of 7 per cent compared to the number of civilians killed by anti-Government elements during the same period in 2010. Pro-Government forces caused 203 civilian casualties (83 deaths and 120 injuries, or 10 per cent of the total number of civilian deaths during the reporting period). This represents a decrease of 25 per cent of civilian deaths attributed to pro-Government forces, in comparison to the same period in 2010; 13 per cent of civilian deaths could not be attributed to any party to the conflict.

28. The majority of civilian deaths were attributed to the continued use of improvised explosive devices and targeted killings by anti-Government elements. Improvised explosive device attacks were the single greatest contributor to civilian deaths responsible for 296 civilians killed, 37 per cent of all civilian deaths. The number of civilians killed by improvised explosive devices increased by 4 per cent, compared to the same period in 2010. Targeted killings of Government officials and persons with actual or perceived ties to the Government of Afghanistan or ISAF occurred throughout the country, with 180 deaths, an increase of 34 per cent, compared to the same period in 2010. Suicide attacks resulting in civilian casualties increased by 13 per cent, compared with the same period last year. Civilian casualties as a result of air strikes decreased 26 per cent, compared with the same three-month period in 2010, while civilian casualties from night search operations during the reporting period increased to 10 (8 killed and 2 injured), as compared with four civilian casualties (1 person killed and 3 injured) during the same period in 2010.

29. On 10 October, UNAMA publicly released a report entitled "Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody". Based on extensive interviews conducted from October 2010 to August 2011 with 379 detainees at 47 facilities in 22 provinces, the report documented the use of interrogation techniques that constituted torture and other forms of mistreatment. Some individuals were detained by both the National Directorate of Security and the Afghan National Police. Almost half (46 per cent) of the 273 conflict-related detainees held by the National Directorate of Security who UNAMA interviewed experienced torture, and 35 per cent of the 117 individuals detained by the Afghan National Police suffered similar treatment. While UNAMA did not find that torture was a Government or institutional policy, it found compelling evidence that torture occurred systematically in five facilities of the National Directorate of Security and in several facilities of the Afghan National Police. The National Directorate of Security and the Afghan National Police provided UNAMA with access to their facilities throughout the observation period and initiated a plan of remedial measures to address the findings of the report. ISAF immediately suspended detainee transfers to 16 detention facilities that UNAMA had identified as locations where torture occurred and announced a remediation plan of inspection, human rights training, monitoring and supporting Government accountability actions.

30. In an effort to promote an inclusive peace and reconciliation process, UNAMA facilitated the Afghan People's Dialogue on Peace, comprising 12 civil society organizations and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. The initiative conducted more than 65 focus groups with approximately 1,500 Afghans from all walks of life throughout the country, who discussed their views on peace, security, transition, the rule of law, impunity and the role of the international community. As outlined in the report of the Steering Committee on the dialogue

events, which was prepared in late November and distributed at the International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, participants highlighted that corruption is pervasive, affecting nearly every aspect of their lives, leading to insecurity, lack of economic development and opportunity and violations of their rights. They also noted that the international military presence and international development assistance should play a role in addressing corruption as an urgent priority. Participants stressed the need for neutral interlocutors to assist in peace negotiations between the Government and insurgents.

31. On 23 November, UNAMA released the report, "A Long Way to Go", documenting the criminal justice system's implementation of the 2009 Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women. Examining the performance of judges, prosecutors and police throughout Afghanistan from March 2010 to August 2011, UNAMA found some progress in the application of the law. However, the use of the law represented a very small percentage of the Government's handling of cases of violence against women. The report found that most cases, including serious cases of murder and rape, were still mediated through a variety of mechanisms, rather than prosecuted as required by the law. In this context, the United Nations Gender Working Group developed joint messages to promote gender equity in Afghanistan, particularly in view of transition. Afghan women's civil society and advocacy groups and the United Nations carried these messages to the International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn in order to highlight the continued need to support women's rights and empowerment in Afghanistan.

32. The United Nations-led country task force on children and armed conflict continued to support the Government of Afghanistan in the implementation of the action plan, signed in February 2011, on the prevention of child recruitment and to monitor grave violations against children committed by parties to the conflict. During the reporting period, the most frequent violations continued to be recruitment and use of children, including for suicide bombing missions or for planting explosives — with a recent rise in reported cross-border recruitment by Taliban — as well as attacks on schools. The killing and maiming of children remains of grave concern, especially in the light of a notable increase in incidents injuring or killing children.

IV. Implementation of the Kabul Process and aid coherence

33. During the reporting period, the Kabul Process and its supporting architecture in the form of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board regained prominence. As follow-on to the June/July 2011 Standing Committees, and after an 11-month hiatus due to the issues surrounding the Kabul Bank situation, a meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board was held on 19 October. On 15 October, parliamentary approval of the supplementary budget to recapitalize the Kabul Bank fulfilled the central precondition for the approval of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) country programme; this, in turn, opened the space for re-engagement, through the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, between the Government of Afghanistan, UNAMA and the international community.

34. At the 19 October meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, three key principles of engagement were agreed to in addition to the endorsement of seven national priority programmes: (i) centrality and sustainability of the Kabul Process linked to the process of transition; (ii) mutual accountability; and

(iii) improved efficiency of the use of development resources supporting the Afghan Government's development and governance priorities defined by national priority programmes.

35. On 14 November, the IMF Executive Board and the Government of Afghanistan successfully concluded negotiations on a three-year IMF programme for Afghanistan. The Government of Afghanistan firmly committed to an aggressive programme of efficiency and reform with a focus on increasing domestic revenue collection, strengthening the financial sector, and implementing a progressive pro-poor taxation regime. The resolution of these negotiations, which had overshadowed the governance and development agenda since September 2010, allowed for re-engagement of on-budget funding modalities such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and the formal re-engagement of the international community in the Kabul Process through the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board.

36. A second series of Standing Committees were held on 26 and 27 November on governance and socio-economic development, followed by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board meeting on 30 November. The Standing Committees provided an opportunity for frank exchange during which the Government and the international community agreed to refocus discussions on ensuring sound finance mechanisms for realizing government priorities via national priority programmes. Two additional national priority programmes were then endorsed by the Board, bringing the total number to 11 of 22 national programmes endorsed in principle at the 2010 Kabul Conference.

37. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board endorsed in principle the process put forward in a paper by the Government of Afghanistan to address the fiscal gap that the country will face following transition. It combines commitments made to IMF with renewed commitments to encourage economic growth, human development and public service delivery. The paper, entitled "Towards a Self-Sustaining Afghanistan", informed discussions between the Government and the international community at the International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn. Donors also agreed to work with the Government through the Kabul Process to implement the national priority programmes in a sustainable and fiscally responsible manner.

V. Governance and rule of law

38. Government efforts continued to address the limited presence of justice sector officials at the district level due to security concerns, poor infrastructure and low salaries. Of symbolic significance was the convening of the second general assembly of the Afghan Independent Bar Association. Founded in 2008, it has seen a threefold increase in members, from 400 to almost 1,200 at present. While there is room for development, recognition of the role and the importance of an independent legal profession is growing among law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and the courts.

39. In an effort to support the Independent Directorate of Local Governance and coordinate international assistance for more effective provincial councils pursuing good governance principles, UNAMA conducted a study on the strengths and weaknesses of the councils. The study, produced in October, provided policy

recommendations to the Independent Directorate of Local Governance and relevant stakeholders to promote a more effective, inclusive and transparent system of representative governance, including (i) a renewed emphasis on respect for established rules and procedures; (ii) a revision of the existing Provincial Council Law and Rules of Procedure to further define roles and responsibilities; (iii) increased financial support; (iv) continued capacity development; and (v) consideration of amendments to relevant legislation to promote better representation of all districts and communities.

40. UNAMA continued to coordinate financial and technical support to the new government-led provincial budgeting process, a pilot initiative outlining mechanisms for the delegation of financial and procurement authorities from the central government to the provinces. Once implemented, the mechanism could help promote a more effective, transparent and efficient financial reporting system, addressing key provisions of the subnational governance policy.

41. Furthermore, the United Nations-supported Afghanistan subnational governance programme established letters of agreements facilitating the deployment of technical expertise and the procurement of services and goods to directorates of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, 32 provincial governors' offices, provincial councils and municipalities. These letters of agreement are an important step towards establishing mechanisms for financial de-concentration of authority to the subnational level.

42. The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Committee carried out its third two-week visit to Afghanistan since its inauguration in May 2011. It has finalized 31 recommendations for Government ministries and the international community to fight corruption at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. It now intends to discuss the implementation of these recommendations with the President, Government ministries, donors, and civil society, and is expected to produce a public report on implementation progress.

VI. Development and humanitarian assistance

43. On 16 October, the Central Statistics Organization, with United Nations technical support, presented the first provincial socio-demographic and economic survey and extensive listing of establishments, institutions and households in Bamyan. The survey provides critical data for development planning, policymaking and public administration. Covering 35,000 to 40,000 households, it is the largest and most comprehensive socio-economic survey to date in Afghanistan, providing data down to the district level. The Central Statistics Organization intends to replicate this survey in the remaining 33 provinces of Afghanistan between 2012 and 2014 in order to provide robust national and subnational data. To accomplish that, an additional $96 million in funding will be required.

44. To help guide discussions over the next 6 to 12 months in preparation for the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) midterm review and the 2014-2018 UNDAF, the current set of priorities will see the addition of seven new areas. Keeping in mind the need for coherence with Afghan Government national priority programmes, the additional priority areas are (i) capacity development; (ii) youth; (iii) urban development; (iv) population issues;

(v) reintegration of returnees; (vi) natural resource management; and (vii) essential data required to clearly indicate progress towards development results.

45. Limited snow and rainfall during the past winter and spring caused a slow-onset drought. That impacted the food security, nutrition, health and access to water of an estimated 3 million people in 14 provinces in the north, north-east and west of the country in mid-2011. The humanitarian community is working to respond to the needs arising from this emergency with the drought coordination cell established by the Government of Afghanistan under the leadership of the Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock, Mohammed Asef Rahimi. A Consolidated Appeal for Afghanistan launch on 1 October in Kabul, and officiated by Vice-President Khalili, increased the Appeal from $453 million to $582 million. The Appeal is currently 59 per cent funded. The food security cluster, under the co-leadership of the World Food Programme and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, prepared a detailed response to address the drought in the affected provinces through September 2012, through the distribution of animal feed and seeds, food assistance, and food and cash for work programmes.

46. As part of the water, sanitation and hygiene response in the north, north-east and central regions, safe drinking water was provided by the United Nations through emergency water tankering and the rehabilitation of water sources, benefiting an estimated 1 million people. As at the end of October 2011, the severe acute malnutrition programme had admitted and provided treatment to 31,385 severe acutely malnourished children, nearly double the 16,700 cases recorded in 2010.

47. The United Nations has estimated that, as at the end of September 2011, there were some 450,000 conflict-induced internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan. Since the previous report, continued conflict between the Government, NATO/ISAF and anti-Government elements has resulted in the estimated displacement of some 162,000 people between January and October 2011, a 51 per cent increase over the same period last year. A key challenge has been the spread of dry conditions and drought across much of the northern and western regions of Afghanistan, including to places of origin of IDPs. This has resulted in further vulnerabilities and displacements.

48. The Ministry of Public Health of Afghanistan, with the support of the United Nations, continued its stepped-up efforts to eradicate polio, focusing particularly on the southern region, where the majority of cases were reported. The country as a whole is experiencing an outbreak of wild polio viruses, with 58 cases reported to date in 2011, up from 20 in 2010. An additional round of targeted polio vaccinations in a number of high-risk districts was undertaken by the United Nations at the end of November. The United Nations also provided essential medicines to provincial health directorates in order to boost emergency preparedness and emergency medical supplies in order to support the response to large-scale disease outbreaks of measles, cholera and typhoid fever, exceeding local response capacities.

49. The United Nations supported the finalization of the Afghanistan reproductive health strategy and action plan, and the development of the first national policy and strategy of nursing and midwifery services. The National Maternal and Child Survival Committee and eight provincial committees were established to support implementation. Recognizing that health is a human right, the United Nations supported the development of the initial draft of the Ministry of Public Health's health and human rights policy.

50. As literacy and women's empowerment are critical areas in Afghanistan, the United Nations supported over 322 women's literacy centres in Daikundi and Badakshan, two provinces targeted for maternal and newborn health initiatives, during the reporting period. Further, in September, a budget of $55.7 million was approved for Afghanistan under the Global Partnership for Education Programme. The programme, spanning three years, aims to increase equitable access to education, specifically for girls, in 55 districts of 13 provinces with low education and security indicators.

VII. Counter-narcotics

51. The Afghan Opium Survey 2011, conducted by the Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics and UNODC and released on 11 October, showed that, because of insecurity and high prices, poppy cultivation in Afghanistan reached 131,000 hectares, 7 per cent higher than in 2010. Seventy-eight per cent of cultivation was concentrated in Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Daikundi and Zabul Provinces in the south, and 17 per cent in Farah, Badghis and Nimroz Provinces in the west. These are among the most insecure provinces in the country. However, the insurgency is not the main driver behind cultivation: most of the profits from opium are made by other segments of the society, including corrupt officials, landowners and criminals. The potential production in 2011 is expected to reach 5,800 tons, up 61 per cent from 3,600 tons produced in 2010. Dry opium prices increased by 43 per cent, compared with 2010; and the total farm gate value of opium production is set to increase by 133 per cent, from $605 million in 2010 to $1.4 billion in 2011.

52. The Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, which had been expected to be downgraded to a regular police force, remained as a stand-alone department within the Ministry of the Interior, headed by the Deputy Minister of Counter-Narcotics. The Ministry and supporting law enforcement agencies (Ministry of the Interior, the National Directorate of Security, the Combined Joint Task Force) launched a new initiative aimed at sanctioning owners and lessees as foreseen by the law on campaigning against intoxicants and drugs and on their control. The initiative aimed to inform and warn the population about the provision of the counter-narcotics law, according to which land under poppy cultivation will be subject to forced eradication, while the landowners will face prosecution.

53. Counter-narcotics ministers from Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan met on 28 November in Kabul to enhance responses to regional security challenges under the Triangular Initiative framework brokered by UNODC. Since its launch in 2007, the Initiative, has promoted information exchange and intelligence-led operations targeting the major transnational networks, while building confidence. Since 2009, 12 drug control operations coordinated by the joint planning cell have resulted in the seizures of several tons of illicit drugs and the arrest of many drug traffickers. The ministerial declaration signed by the three countries further strengthened this cooperation. In addition, the ministers identified emerging threats in the region, including maritime trafficking and money-laundering, which will be addressed in future Triangular Initiative operations. UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov attended the meeting, which coincided with his visit to Kabul from 27 to 29 November.

VIII. Mission support

54. Security enhancement works in line with the revised minimum operating security standards were continued in field offices throughout the country. In the current adverse security-related operating environment in the Mission, we are not yet able to forecast an end date for this work. The security situation continues to evolve and the Mission continues to take additional risk mitigation measures. However, save for additional upgrades, at present it is not foreseen that 2012 will require any major new projects.

55. All regional headquarters remained operational. Substantial progress was made in the construction of the new regional compound in Mazar-i-Sharif and the new Kandahar regional compound is nearing completion. As anticipated in the previous report (A/66/369-S/2011/590), staff returned to most provincial offices upon completion of the additional security enhancement works required under the updated minimum operating security standards.

56. The overall vacancy rate as at October 2011 was 18 per cent for international staff and 9 per cent for national staff. The UNAMA budget proposal for 2012, which amounts to $241.5 million (compared to $270.7 million in 2011), maintaining the current level of UNAMA outreach and activities, is currently under review by the United Nations legislative bodies.

IX. Observations

57. Developments of the last few months, including the assassination of Mr. Rabbani in early September, ongoing regional anxieties and roiling global economic crisis, have pointed to the need for greater predictability in the country's transition. In this regard, it is critical that Afghanistan, with the support of its partners and the United Nations on the ground, make a concerted effort to forge a national consensus on key issues. This includes involving civil society in a broad-based dialogue aimed at advancing the peace process and reinforcing the country's institutions; sustaining the momentum of the regional process agreed to in Istanbul; ensuring a unified, predictable, transparent and well-resourced economic and development agenda, through an invigorated Kabul Process; and buttressing its key partnerships for the long term, beyond 2014.

58. Mr. Rabbani's killing was a setback, but it should not and cannot deter efforts towards Afghan-led reconciliation. Rather it should provide an opportunity for all Afghans to come together in a moment of national unity to make a renewed commitment to peace through dialogue. Redoubled efforts are required to address the trust deficit, build mutual confidence and advance a comprehensive and inclusive peace process. It is essential that all sides, including the insurgency, commit to peaceful engagement in the dialogue process and to undertake preventive measures against actions that may undermine the process. A proper investigation of the assassination would help restore confidence and prevent any further loss of momentum. The Loya Jirga marked a first step towards continued dialogue by reaffirming the support for negotiations. I assure the President of Afghanistan, the High Peace Council and Minister Stanekzai of my full support as they continue to lead this important effort.

59. The Istanbul Conference presented a clear vision and commitment to work in a results-oriented process towards greater stability and prosperity in Afghanistan and in the region as a whole. The Istanbul Process provides a basis for regional actors to move forward, in a structured manner with articulated tools and clear principles, towards strengthened regional cooperation on a range of issues, including security. It is now up to the members of the region to demonstrate their commitment to the Process and its objectives by ensuring that it (i) moves forward constructively and pragmatically; and (ii) remains regionally owned but with international supporters. Given the inclusion of counter-narcotics in the confidence-building measures, I encourage the donor community to mainstream counter-narcotics within national priority programmes, developing concrete indicators and providing sufficiently funded budgets.

60. The need for Afghanistan and Pakistan to strengthen their bilateral relations remains paramount in furthering peace, reconciliation and stability. The trilateral meeting between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey was the latest positive step in this regard. The Afghanistan-Pakistan Joint Commission on Reconciliation and Peace is a useful vehicle for pursuing a structured dialogue on relevant critical issues of mutual interest. I encourage Afghanistan and Pakistan to continue utilizing such mechanisms with a view to addressing and resolving issues of mutual concern.

61. The protection of civilians remains a critical and pressing concern of both Afghans and the international community. Regrettably, civilian casualties remained at high levels during the reporting period. Anti-government elements continued their indiscriminate use of pressure-plate improvised explosive devices and assassinations, which killed more civilians than any other means. Although there remains a long way to go, the Government has increasingly acknowledged the need to take serious measures to ensure adequate protection for women and detainees, including by observing basic legal protections and enforcing institutional accountability.

62. Efforts made to improve security need to be matched by bettering the living conditions of the Afghan people. The Human Development Index report illustrates that progress is being made by the Government together with the international community in improving socio-economic conditions, many of which stagnated during the civil war period of the 1990s. Yet the Index also points to the challenges that remain in regard to poverty and social inequalities. Here, complacency is not an option. The long-term challenges of balancing the economic dimensions of the security transition within the broader Kabul Process must be linked to the delivery of real and tangible improvements in the lives of ordinary Afghan citizens. For example, investments in promoting literacy and equal access to education will contribute to helping to unlock the economic potential of the country and to attaining the Millennium Development Goals. International partners are increasingly aware that improvements in governance, socio-economic development and the rule of law are inextricably linked to a successful and irreversible security transition. With an expected decline of resources in support of the governance and development agenda, effective leveraging, coordination and use of financing becomes increasingly critical. Thus, more attention will need to be given to balancing security and non-security investments in the medium to long term. The International Conference on Afghanistan, held in Bonn in 2011, set forth a road map to engage in these discussions.

63. The Bonn Conference reaffirmed the long-term commitment of the international community in support of Afghanistan beyond 2014. Shifting strategy from stabilization to long-term development cooperation, participants recommitted to aligning assistance with Government priorities and to improving efficiency of aid resources, including through the channelling of a growing share of aid through the Government budget. Partners insisted upon continued reforms in the governance and anti-corruption sector so as to ensure the transparent and accountable use of resources. While Afghan line ministries have made some progress towards vertical integration, further work is required in linking planning and activities at the subnational level (particularly in view of the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Team) to those developed through national priority programmes. The United Nations will continue to support efforts towards development coherence both in Kabul and at the subnational level under the guidance and leadership of the Government of Afghanistan and with the support and active engagement of international partners.

64. Afghanistan's transition is inextricably linked to those strategic partnerships that commit to the country's future beyond 2014. Until such agreements become more tangible in their assurances, the security transition process will move along at a quick pace, but with uncertain long-term development commitments for the Afghan people. Of particular importance are those "guarantees" that fund the Government's key Afghan national development programmes, both security and non-security, as well as proven activities and programmes.

65. At the same time, we must not lose sight of the more immediate humanitarian concerns that many Afghans face on a daily basis. I encourage continued cooperation both within Afghanistan and the region to promote sustainable and durable solutions to the country's displaced. Given the nearly 3 million Afghan refugees in neighbouring countries and the more than 5.7 million returnees, the United Nations, with the Governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, is planning an international conference in the spring of 2012, which will aim to explore a comprehensive, multi-year strategy for this long-standing issue. I fully support this initiative and anticipate concrete, substantive outcomes that can offer real solutions to the large number of still-displaced Afghans.

66. Throughout 2011, the Government has provided leadership in addressing numerous humanitarian issues, most notably the response to the ongoing drought. The 2012 Afghanistan Consolidated Appeal launched by the Emergency Relief Coordinator calls attention to immediate humanitarian needs and to the need to ensure continuity and coherence between the developmental and humanitarian interventions in support of the efforts of the Government. However, its goals can only be met if the right to assistance for those in need and access to them is forthcoming. Following the tragic loss of staff working for the Office of the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees in Kandahar on 31 October and the routine intimidation and threats received by humanitarian workers, I again call upon all parties in the conflict to respect the impartiality and the neutrality of humanitarian actors and the right of the most vulnerable communities to receive assistance.

67. The United Nations in Afghanistan has been contributing to Afghan and international efforts by supporting the search for a peaceful solution to the conflict, protecting human rights and encouraging coherent and effective support for various governance, development and humanitarian challenges. I wish to underscore the

importance of ensuring the security and the safety of United Nations staff as the Organization remains a committed partner to the Government and people of Afghanistan.

68. We have now moved into a new phase of long-term engagement, support and partnership between the international community and Afghanistan. Clearly, as Afghanistan makes progress towards peace and improved governance, the role of the United Nations will continue to be assessed.

69. The new Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Jan Kubis, will assume his duties on 16 January 2012. In this regard, I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Special Representative Staffan de Mistura for his service. His efforts have ensured that the United Nations has joined with the Government of Afghanistan and the international community in supporting the realization of a modern, democratic and sovereign State. Throughout his career with the United Nations, Mr. de Mistura has championed the values and the principles that we collectively embody. I would also like to thank the United Nations staff for their commitment and dedication to enacting these same values and principles on a daily basis despite the risks they face. In doing so, they make sure we deliver on our commitments to the people of Afghanistan.

United Nations S/2011/773

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 December 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 13 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

With reference to the letter from the representative of the Israeli regime dated 29 November 2011 (S/2011/743), in which certain unfounded allegations and distortions were made against the Islamic Republic of Iran, I wish to state the following.

The Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects the allegations concerning the so-called "transfers of arms from Iran" into Lebanon, which are based on false and misleading information provided by the Zionist regime. Iran's support for the resistance and Hizbullah has been of a moral, humanitarian and political nature. It is not the first time that the Israeli regime, in a futile exercise to distract the international community's attention from its crimes and atrocities against Lebanon, resorts to a campaign of distortion, slander and fabrication against others.

In the course of the invasion by Israeli forces into Lebanon in 2006, the international community witnessed various acts of war crimes and crimes against humanity that the Israeli regime has mercilessly committed against the Lebanese people with impunity. Since then, the Israeli enemy army has continued to violate the sovereignty of the Lebanese territory, airspace and territorial waters on a daily basis, carrying out hostile activities across the Blue Line and installing the spying networks that were uncovered in recent months, which constitute a flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). Contrary to what has been claimed, there is absolutely no link between those violations and claims of so-called arms smuggling.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been, and will remain, resolute in its support for stability and security in the Middle East, while the Israeli regime has been the only source of tension and violence in the region for decades. Undoubtedly, the Israeli regime fabricates groundless allegations in order to distract the international community's attention from the atrocities it has committed against the peoples in the region.

Regrettably, the impunity with which the said regime has been allowed to carry out its crimes and violations thus far has emboldened it to continue and even increase its blatant defiance of the most basic and fundamental principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. It is, indeed, high time for the international community, and especially the Security Council, to take effective measures to counter the illegal and criminal policies and practices of the Israeli

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regime and to put an end to its State terrorism against the peoples and nations in the region.

It would be appreciated if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammad **Khazaee**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/66/607–S/2011/774

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
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General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda items 34, 35 and 39

Prevention of armed conflict

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Letter dated 13 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the military forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, recorded for the period from 31 October to 30 November 2011 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34, 35 and 39, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Garen **Nazarian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

11-64014 (E) 211211

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Annex to the letter dated 13 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan from 31 October to 30 November 2011

N	(Direction)	Date, time	Firing	
			From Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
1.	Vazashen	31.10.11 15.25	AK	5
2.	Vazashen	31.10.11 15.25	AK	2
3.	Vazashen	31.10.11 17.00	machine gun 12.7mm	15
4.	Vazashen	31.10.11 17.00	SVD	7
5.	Vazashen	31.10.11 17.00	PK	7
6.	Vazashen	31.10.11 19.20	AK	1
7.	Vazashen	31.10.11 22.20	AK	15
8.	Eraskh	31.10.11 10.30	SVD	3
9.	Vazashen	01.11.11 21.10	AK	1
10.	Eraskh	01.11.11 13.10	SVD	4
11.	Bardzruni	01.11.11 10.15	SV 12.7mm	4
12.	Bardzruni	01.11.11 12.15	SVD	5
13.	Bardzruni	01.11.11 13.15	SVD	10
14.	Bardzruni	01.11.11 13.45	SVD	10
15.	Bardzruni	01.11.11 14.10	SVD	10
16.	Bardzruni	01.11.11 14.40	SV 12.7mm	5
17.	Bardzruni	01.11.11 15.10	SV 12.7mm	8

18.	Bardzruni	01.11.11 15.25	SV 12.7mm	6
19.	Bardzruni	01.11.11 15.40	SV 12.7mm	10
20.	Vazashen	02.11.11 16.40	AK	3
21.	Bardzruni	02.11.11 11.00-11.15	SV 12.7mm	4
22.	Bardzruni	02.11.11 16.90	AK	9
23.	Vazashen	03.11.11 20.00	AK	3
24.	Bardzruni	03.11.11 10.20	SV 12.7mm	17
25.	Bardzruni	03.11.11 15.25	SV 12.7mm	1
26.	Artsvaberd	04.11.11 16.50	PK	11
27.	Vazashen	04.11.11 17.45	AK	20
28.	Tigranakert	04.11.11 16.30	AK	4
29.	Bardzruni	04.11.11 15.50	SVD	4
30.		05.11.11 09.45	AK	2
31.	Vazashen	05.11.11 21.00	AK	2
32.	Voskevan	05.11.11 15.00	AK	4
33.	Barekamavan	05.11.11 20.45	AK	5
34.	Bardzruni	05.11.11 11.25	AK	9
35.	Bardzruni	05.11.11 12.45	SVD	43
36.	Bardzruni	05.11.11 12.45	SV 12.7mm	1
37.	Bardzruni	05.11.11 13.20	SV 12.7mm	1
38.	Kayanavan	05.11.11 20.25	RPK	7
39.	Eraskh	06.11.11 08.45	AK	1
40.	Bardzruni	06.11.11 09.00	AK	4

41.	Khndzorut	06.11.11 20.45	AK	8
42.	Khndzorut	06.11.11 21.35	AK	3
43.	Bardzruni	07.11.11 11.00	SV 12.7mm	1
44.	Bardzruni	07.11.11 11.00	SVD	1
45.	Bardzruni	07.11.11 11.45	SV 12.7mm	2
46.	Bardzruni	07.11.11 11.45	SVD	5
47.	Bardzruni	07.11.11 11.45	AK	1
48.	Bardzruni	07.11.11 15.35	SV 12.7mm	2
49.	Bardzruni	07.11.11 15.35	SVD	1
50.	Chinari	08.11.11 17.20	SVD	4
51.	Chinari	08.11.11 17.20	AK	4
52.	Berqaber	08.11.11 17.30	AK	6
53.	Bardzruni	08.11.11 13.35	SV 12.7mm	1
54.	Chinari	09.11.11 17.00	SVD	15
55.	Chinari	09.11.11 17.00	AK	5
56.	Chinari	10.11.11 01.30	PK	20
57.	Vazashen	10.11.11 00.15	PK	15
58.	Bardzruni	09.11.11 24.00	AK	25
59.	Berqaber	10.11.11 16.35	AK	2
60.	Movses	11.11.11 13.35	AK	3
61.	Barekamavan	11.11.11 13.40	SVD	5
62.	Chinari	12.11.11 23.30	SVD	10
63.	Chinari	13.11.11 23.30	SVD	5

64.	Chinari	13.11.11 23.30	PK	5
65.	Chinari	13.11.11 23.30	SVD	7
66.	Barekamavan	13.11.11 12.00	SVD	6
67.	Movses	15.11.11 17.45	AK	4
68.	Bardzruni	15.11.11 12.25	AK	4
69.	Khndzorut	15.11.11 14.25	AK	3
70.	Bardzruni	15.11.11 15.50	SV 12.7mm	1
71.	Chinari	16.11.11 15.00-18.00	SV 12.7mm	8
72.	Chinari	16.11.11 15.00-18.00	PK	100
73.	Chinari	16.11.11 15.00-18.00	SVD	25
74.	Berdavan	16.11.11 14.55	SVD	4
75.	Bardzruni	16.11.11 11.35	AK	4
76.	Bardzruni	16.11.11 16.00	AK	7
77.	Bardzruni	16.11.11 17.35	SV 12.7mm	14
78.	Bardzruni	16.11.11 17.35	AK	20
79.	Bardzruni	16.11.11 19.10	SV 12.7mm	10
80.	Bardzruni	16.11.11 19.10	SVD	30
81.	Bardzruni	16.11.11 19.10	PK	20
82.	Bardzruni	16.11.11 19.10	AK	20
83.	Bardzruni	16.11.11 20.00	AK	15
84.	Bardzruni	16.11.11 20.00	SV 12.7mm	2
85.	Bardzruni	17.11.11 10.35	SV 12.7mm	4
86.	Bardzruni	17.11.11 11.10	SV 12.7mm	5

87.	Bardzruni	17.11.11 12.20	SV 12.7mm	1
88.	Bardzruni	17.11.11 13.55	SV 12.7mm	1
89.	Chinari	18.11.11 10.15	SV 12.7mm	5
90.	Chinari	18.11.11 10.15	PK	30
91.	Sevakavan	18.11.11 20.05	AK	2
92.	Bardzruni	18.11.11 14.55	AK	15
93.	Bardzruni	18.11.11 17.25	SV 12.7mm	1
94.	Bardzruni	18.11.11 17.25	AK	6
95.		19.11.11 13.10	AK	4
96.	Sevakavan	19.11.11 17.20	AK	2
97.	Sevakavan	19.11.11 17.40	AK	2
98.	Bardzruni	19.11.11 18.25	AK	6
99.	Bardzruni	19.11.11 18.25	SV 12.7mm	1
100.	Zaligyukh	21.11.11 02.00	AK	8
101.	Berdavan	21.11.11 02.35	AK	8
102.	Eraskh	20.11.11 09.30	AK	3
103.	Bardzruni	20.11.11 11.05	SV 12.7mm	1
104.	Bardzruni	20.11.11 11.30	SV 12.7mm	2
105.	Bardzruni	20.11.11 11.45	SV 12.7mm	2
106.	Bardzruni	20.11.11 16.45	AK	5
107.	Bardzruni	21.11.11 00.40	AK	5
108.	Chinari	21.11.11 19.45	AK	10
109.	Movses	21.11.11 15.55	PK	5

110.	Movses	21.11.11 16.00	PK	5
111.	Berqaber	21.11.11 16.00	AK	15
112.	Berdavan	21.11.11 12.30	PK	13
113.	Bardzruni	21.11.11 14.50	AK	13
114.	Bardzruni	21.11.11 16.40	AK	5
115.	Bardzruni	21.11.11 17.40	AK	12
116.	Bardzruni	22.11.11 10.40	SV 12.7mm	1
117.	Bardzruni	22.11.11 16.20	SV 12.7mm	1
118.	Bardzruni	22.11.11 17.30	SV 12.7mm	1
119.	Bardzruni	22.11.11 23.05	AK	20
120.	Bardzruni	22.11.11 23.05	PK	15
121.	Bardzruni	22.11.11 23.05	SVD	5
122.	Aygepar	23.11.11 22.15	AK	1
123.	Sevakavan	23.11.11 13.05	AK	3
124.	Bardzruni	23.11.11 11.10	SV 12.7mm	2
125.	Bardzruni	23.11.11 11.55	SV 12.7mm	3
126.	Bardzruni	23.11.11 12.40	SV 12.7mm	3
127.	Bardzruni	23.11.11 17.05	SV 12.7mm	2
128.	Bardzruni	24.11.11 16.20	SV 12.7mm	2
129.	Eraskh	25.11.11 12.20	AK	1
130.	Bardzruni	25.11.11 15.05	SVD	2
131.	Bardzruni	25.11.11 15.20	SV 12.7mm	4
132.	Khndzorut	25.11.11 16.25	AK	2

133.	Vazashen	26.11.11 20.30	AK	1
134.	Chinari	27.11.11 14.30	SVD	3
135.	Eraskh	28.11.11 22.05	AK	1
136.	Eraskh	28.11.11 22.15	AK	1
137.	Bardzruni	28.11.11 14.45	SVD	4
138.	Bardzruni	28.11.11 15.40	SV 12.7mm	2
139.	Bardzruni	28.11.11 15.40	SVD	2
140.	Bardzruni	28.11.11 17.45	SVD	5
141.	Eraskh	29.11.11 12.45	AK	1
142.	Eraskh	30.11.11 22.30	AK	2
143.	Eraskh	30.11.11 22.30	AK	2
144.	Bardzruni	30.11.11 18.30	SVD	2
145.	Bardzruni	30.11.11 19.20	SVD	5
146.	Bardzruni	30.11.11 19.25	AK	3

The violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Armenia from 31 October to 30 November 2011:
Number of violations — 146
Shots — about 1035
PK ~ (246), RPK ~ (7), SVD- (242), sniper weapon 12.7 mm – (142), machine gun 12.7 mm - (15), AK ~ (383).

The violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh from 31 October to 30 November 2011:
Number of violations — 1079
Shots — about 5843
PK ~ (1462), SVD- (576), machine gun 12.7 mm ~ (43), sniper weapon 12.7mm – (40), sniper weapon Istigal 14.5 mm - (30), UTYOS-12.7 mm ~ (41), RPK ~ (21) , AK ~ (3630).

United Nations A/66/623–S/2011/775

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Security Council

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Sixty-sixth session
Agenda item 69 (c)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 15 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter regarding the position of the Syrian Government with regard to the presentation delivered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Security Council on Monday, 12 December 2011 (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 69 (c), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

11-64864 (E) 221211 221211

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 15 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

On Monday, 12 December 2011, the Security Council held a closed meeting on the agenda item concerning the situation in the Middle East. In the course of that meeting, a statement from the High Commissioner for Human Rights was heard which addressed the situation of human rights in Syria. That statement was politicized, unprofessional and lacking in objectivity, and was consistent with the agendas of certain States that wish to destroy Syria and make a military incursion into it on the pretext of protecting civilians. In her statement, Ms. Pillay held the Syrian Government solely responsible for the events that are taking place, and greatly exceeded the terms of her mandate and that of her Office by recommending that the Council should refer Syria to the International Criminal Court, ignoring the human rights violations that are carried out by terrorist groups and the millions of dollars that they are receiving in the form of money, arms, and propaganda and logistical support, which aim to destroy Syria and kill its people.

The High Commissioner has yet again demonstrated her lack of credibility and lack of professionalism with regard to the situation of human rights in Syria and the politicization of her work. Similarly, the report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry has again been shown to be unprofessional and politicized. Through numerous meetings and communications, Syria has cooperated with the High Commissioner for Human Rights from the very inception of the events. It has also cooperated with the Commission and provided it with numerous documents and certified information on the real situation in Syria. However, both those parties have ignored that cooperation and disregarded anything with which they were provided by Syria.

Syria has assured the High Commissioner and the Commission that it has established an impartial, independent judicial investigative committee that has wide powers to investigate all crimes committed in the course of the current events. That committee is operating continuously in order to establish the truth, bring closure to victims and punish perpetrators. We have repeatedly made it clear that the work of this committee has not been concluded and that the Syrian Government does not wish to pre-empt its work and present outcomes that are subjective or have political aims, as the Commission did in its report.

We have affirmed our readiness to consider cooperating with the Commission as soon as the Syrian investigative committee has reached concrete conclusions. However, the High Commissioner and the Commission have rejected that offer and have, instead, chosen to listen to those they call "witnesses", regional and international organizations, journalists, non-governmental organizations and those whom they call dissident members of the security and armed forces. Here, we should like to ask the High Commissioner and the members of the Commission whether they invited any members of the family of child martyr Sari Sa'ud to Geneva to give their testimony? Have they heard any testimony from Zainab, the young woman who was supposedly killed, who has proven to be alive and well?

Have they taken any statements from family members of Brigadier General Khodir al-Talawi, who was murdered in cold blood, together with his three children, their bodies then being put on display? Why have the High Commissioner and the Commission refused to investigate all the documented information with which they have been provided by Syria on the young boy Hamza Khatib and chosen other, exaggerated, media reports in order to direct dangerous accusations against Syria of crimes against humanity? Those who prepared the report relied on interviews with politicians, journalists, persons who have an interest in destroying Syria and citizens of foreign States, some of which are parties to the events in which Syrian people are dying on a daily basis. Some of those persons are directly involved in the fabrication of news that is hostile to Syria, while the hands of others are steeped in Syrian blood. How can the High Commissioner and the Commission claim to be unbiased and objective when they have met none of the above-mentioned victims or any of the numerous other persons who have suffered as a result of the terrorism in Syria?

Hundreds of the terrorists have publicly admitted that they killed demonstrators and that they carried out kidnappings, killed and displayed the bodies of their victims, sought to spread alarm and fabricated news in return for money from certain neighbouring States. Those persons killed anyone who did not agree to demonstrate with them or collude with them in destroying Syria, and took pride in their acts of arson, displays of corpses and rapes.

The High Commissioner stated that 5,000 Syrians have been martyred to date. This is absolutely untrue: the vast majority of victims have been supporters of the Government who were killed by the terrorists whose words have been accepted by the High Commissioner.

We should like to remind the High Commissioner that on 22 June 2011, with a view to directing her attention to the non-peaceful nature of what was taking place in Syria, we informed her that more than 260 members of the security and armed forces had died in armed clashes, but the High Commissioner paid no heed. By 20 August 2011, that figure had risen to 600; by 19 October 2011 to 1,100; and it currently stands at over 2,000. Nevertheless, the High Commissioner continues to refuse to accept or even hear that any terrorist operations are being carried out in Syria. Do not those martyrs also have human rights and deserve a mention in the reports and statements of the High Commissioner and the Commission of Inquiry?

We find no reference in the report to the damage that has been wreaked on railway and oil pipe lines, the schools, clinics and official institutions that have been put to the flames or the infrastructure that has been destroyed: do the victims of those violations not merit the concern of the High Commissioner?

Does the fact that citizens have been terrorized and forced to leave their homes and property and go to areas where particular sects predominate, that citizens have been killed and their corpses mutilated in order to divide the country along sectarian lines, and that persons whose rights to life, to a ban on extrajudicial killing and to freedom of religion and belief have been violated not deserve any attention from the High Commissioner and the Commission of Inquiry? We would like to ask whether the High Commissioner and the Commission intend to take any steps with regard to these issues other than to call for the Syrian file to be transferred to the International Criminal Court and for a military invasion of the country that will kill tens of thousands of Syrians, just as in the NATO attack on Libya, in response to which the

High Commissioner did not say a single word, regardless of the fact that more than 50,000 persons were killed in the raids carried out by NATO and its agents.

How is it possible for the Commission of Inquiry to affirm that crimes against humanity have been committed when it has not followed the most basic rules for a professional and objective enquiry with regard to collecting evidence? Unfortunately, the High Commissioner and the Commission of Inquiry have chosen to describe as claims all the evidence that has been put before them of those serious violations of human rights, while the claims made by journalists and representatives of non-governmental organizations are taken as substantiated fact, when there are no links between that information and the evidence. Information has been selectively employed, regardless of its source and credibility, in a clear departure from the basic principles of impartiality, objectivity and professionalism that should be applied in any investigation. Lack of professionalism is evident in the preparation of the report, the precision of its facts and its methodology. Exaggerated and fabricated information was used as the basis for highly dangerous accusations, and recommendations were made that will serve to intensify the campaign against Syria that is being waged by certain States. The report can therefore not be considered in isolation from that campaign.

The High Commissioner and the Commission have exceeded their authority and departed from their humanitarian duty to protect human rights, applying double standards and being politicized. The High Commissioner and the Commission have become involved in a campaign against Syria in a manner that clearly violates their obligations and the resolutions whereby they were appointed. While the Commission was established with a mandate to investigate violations of human rights law, it has exceeded that remit and carried out its investigation in accordance with the rules of the International Criminal Court.

Both the High Commissioner and the Commission have failed to observe one of the most important purposes of the United Nations, namely, to resist the use or threat of military force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

The report of the Commission of Inquiry and the statement of the High Commissioner for Human Rights were completely politicized, selective and unprofessional and fail to observe the most basic rules of international law and international human rights law or even the Charter of the United Nations under whose roof they gathered. That report cannot be used as the basis for any future action against Syria and throws a pernicious shadow over the credibility and role of the Commission for Human Rights and of the United Nations as a whole in protecting and upholding human rights throughout the world.

Syria has in the past affirmed, as it does again today, that the only solution to this crisis is national dialogue. Unfortunately, the High Commissioner and the Commission of Inquiry, who claim to defend human rights, the foremost of which is the right to life, failed to call for any form of such dialogue, preferring to violate Syrian human rights by calling for foreign armies to enter Syria.

Syria has chosen to follow the path of reform and to respond to the demands of its people, and to impartially investigate events. It has also elected to pursue dialogue. We expect the High Commissioner and the Commission to take part in all those measures and assist the Syrian people in moving peacefully, through dialogue,

towards a better future, rather than to call for the involvement of foreign armies on the pretext of protecting civilians.

We call upon all States Members of the United Nations to have no dealings with such unprofessional and politicized reports, which prejudice the credibility and impartiality of the United Nations. We also ask that no heed be paid to calls for foreign intervention in Syria and that their true roles should be restored to the Security Council, General Assembly and United Nations in protecting international peace and security and protecting and upholding human rights: some of those bodies have become tools for involving the use of military force in international relations. Such force has brought misery and human rights violations to all the peoples against whom it has been used, as we have seen on numerous occasions. We call upon States Members to support the plans for reform and dialogue in Syria as a means of ending this crisis, which is letting the life blood of the Syrian people in the interests of foreign projects that do not serve international peace and security or strengthen and protect human rights.

We should like to enquire, now that consideration has been given to the situation in Syria under the agenda item on the situation in the Middle East, what the Security Council has done to protect human rights in another part of Syria, namely, the occupied Syrian Golan? Its population has been subjected to grievous and systematic violations of human rights for more than four decades as part of a regional situation that has been created by the occupying Power, which continues to pose a real threat to international peace and security. The Security Council has chosen to remain silent and to wait for an opinion from great powers that protect the occupying Power, abandoning the inhabitants of the Syrian Golan to a fate that cannot be known, given the total absence of the concept of peace and human rights.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/66/595–S/2011/776

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Security Council

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General Assembly
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Agenda item 36
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 5 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of October 2011 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter issued as an official document of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

11-64255 (E) 191211 221211

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Annex to the identical letters dated 5 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
2 October 2011	1620	While two enemy Poclain machines were placing four concrete blocks in a T shape opposite the Fatimah Gate, members of an Israeli enemy patrol directed their weapons towards Lebanese Army observation post personnel at the Fatimah Gate garden.
3 October 2011	0820	Israeli enemy forces broke into the Lebanese Army cellular telephone network and sent recorded messages in Arabic offering a reward of $10 million for information about Israelis missing in Lebanon.
	1000 1110	The sound of a number of explosions and medium-weapons fire was heard from inside the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1850	From its Hadab position opposite Yarun, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for five minutes towards the Lebanese Army Khirbat Yarun position.
4 October 2011	0900 0915	Members of an Israeli enemy patrol directed their binoculars towards the town of Kafr Killa and the Marj-Khiyam plain.
	1215	Israeli enemy forces broke into the Lebanese Army cellular telephone network and sent recorded messages in Arabic offering a reward of $10 million for information about Israelis missing in Lebanon.
	2145	From its Jabal al-Rus position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for two seconds towards the Lebanese Army Hasan-1 position.
	2245	From its Jabal al-Rus position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for two seconds towards the Lebanese Army Hasan-1 position.
6 October 2011	1246	Israeli enemy forces broke into the Lebanese Army cellular telephone network and sent recorded messages in Arabic offering a reward of $10 million for information about Israelis missing in Lebanon.
	2105	From its Hadab position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for 10 minutes towards the Lebanese Army 750 high site.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
7 October 2011	1500	Israeli enemy forces broke into the cellular telephone network and sent recorded messages in Arabic offering a reward of $10 million for information about Israeli soldiers missing in Lebanon.
	1955 1956	From its Hadab position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese Army Khirbat Yarun and Yarun Heights positions.
8 October 2011	1315	While a Merkava tank was being moved from the Israeli enemy Jabal al-Rus — Ruwaysat al-Alam position to the Jabal Summaqah position, it was halted and its cannon was directed towards the Lebanese Army Hasan-2 position.
	2053	An Israeli enemy motorized patrol directed a searchlight that was mounted on one of the vehicles towards the mosque in the town of Abbasiyah and the surrounding area. Three men then got out of the vehicle and shone torches towards Lebanese territory.
9 October 2011	1130	From the Khallat al-Budiyah-2 position, one of the Israeli enemy observed Lebanese territory through binoculars.
10 October 2011	2105	From its Hadab position opposite Yarun, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for five minutes towards the Lebanese Army Khirbat Yarun position.
	2150	From its Hadab position opposite Yarun, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for five minutes towards the Lebanese Army Khirbat Yarun position.
	2158	From its Hadab position opposite Yarun, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for two minutes towards the Lebanese Army Khirbat Yarun position.
11 October 2011	2015	From its Hadab position opposite Yarun, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for five minutes towards the Lebanese Army Khirbat Yarun position.
	2050	From its Hadab position opposite Yarun, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for two minutes towards a UNIFIL patrol at Birkat Yarun.
16 October 2011	1120 1122	Hebrew words were heard from a Jaguar-type apparatus at the Lebanese Army 3rd Brigade Tallat al-Aqarib-Suhmur position.
19 October 2011	1915	From its Hadab position opposite Yarun, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for one minute towards the Lebanese Army Khirbat Yarun position.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
22 October 2011	2145	From its Ruwaysat al-Alam position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight for five seconds towards the Lebanese Army Hasan-1 position.
23 October 2011	1415	Israeli enemy civilians (one man and four women) used a video camera to photograph the northern part of the village of Ghajar.
24 October 2011	1450	Israeli enemy forces broke into the cellular telephone network and sent recorded messages in Arabic offering a reward of $10 million for information about Israeli soldiers missing in Lebanon.
25 October 2011	0900	Members of an Israeli enemy patrol within occupied Palestinian territory verbally abused and pelted with stones Lebanese shepherds who were minding their flocks on the Khiyam plain opposite the Matallah settlement.
	0930 1430	Loud explosions were heard inside the occupied Shab'a Farms. At the same time, an Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft circled over the area.
27 October 2011	1930	Israeli enemy forces broke into the cellular telephone network and sent recorded messages in Arabic offering a reward of $10 million for information about Israelis missing in Lebanon.

Sea violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
5 October 2011	0145	An Israeli enemy military launch for 40 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of the line of buoys.
	0150	An Israeli enemy military launch for 40 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of the line of buoys.
13 October 2011	0527	An Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute.
	0530	An Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute.
14 October 2011	0600	An Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute.
15 October 2011	2332	An Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight for five minutes towards the Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 3.
	2345	An Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight for three minutes towards the Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 3 and 4.
20 October 2011	0325	An Israeli enemy military launch for 15 seconds directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
	0435	An Israeli enemy military launch for 30 seconds directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
	0440	An Israeli enemy military launch for 20 seconds directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
25 October 2011	2035	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for one minute directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5.
	2040	From its position opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy for 15 seconds directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoys Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5.

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 October 2011	0756	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1137 hours.
	1311	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1331 hours.
	1425	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1500 hours.
	1533	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1548 hours.
	1750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2141 hours.
	1923	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 2256 hours.
2 October 2011	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1415 hours over Rumaysh.
	0815	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1530 hours over Rumaysh.
	1105	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. It circled over the South before leaving at 1110 hours.
	1120	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b at 1700 hours.
	1240	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1245 hours.
	2200	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. It circled over the South before leaving at 2350 hours.
	2210	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 0049 hours on 3 October 2011.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
3 October 2011	0016	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 0305 hours.
	0225	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 0707 hours.
	0653	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1044 hours.
	0829	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1201 hours.
	1030	Six Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1245 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1215	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving over Naqurah at 1740 hours.
	1605	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1610 hours.
	1620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 0800 hours on 4 October 2011.
	1640	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1748 hours.
	1643	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1843 hours.
	1649	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1907 hours.
	1650	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1700 hours.
	1705	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1735 hours.
	1745	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1748 hours.
	1825	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1828 hours.
	1828	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2124 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1934	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2307 hours.
	2339	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 0223 hours on 4 October 2011.
4 October 2011	0151	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 0522 hours.
	0440	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 0752 hours.
	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving over Naqurah at 1940 hours.
	1832	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2148 hours.
	2205	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the Bekaa before leaving over Alma al-Sha'b at 0710 hours on 5 October 2011.
5 October 2011	0728	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 0740 hours.
	1102	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1205 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
6 October 2011	0655	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2100 hours over Rumaysh.
	0735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1810 hours over Rumaysh.
	0755	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and the Bekaa before leaving at 1620 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1110	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1113 hours.
	2020	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 2025 hours.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
9 October 2011	0629	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1520 hours.
	0740	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1905 hours over Naqurah.
	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1900 hours over Naqurah.
	0910	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Al-Arz (the Cedars) and Baalbek before leaving at 1135 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1140	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1215 hours over Rumaysh.
	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2320 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2225	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa and circling over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving over Rumaysh at 0310 hours on 10 October 2011.
10 October 2011	0625	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1430 hours over Rumaysh.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1830 hours over Rumaysh.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2100 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Jubayl and the South before leaving at 1810 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1726	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2253 hours.
	2015	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2230 hours.
11 October 2011	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1515 hours over Naqurah.
	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1710 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Jubayl and the South before leaving at 1600 hours over Naqurah.
	1015	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1420	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2057 hours.
	1530	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1550 hours.
12 October 2011	0950	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1017 hours.
	1501	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1521 hours.
13 October 2011	2240	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 0045 hours on 14 October 2011.
14 October 2011	0001	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, circling over Shab'a, Nabi Uwaydah and Kafr Killa before leaving at 1425 hours.
	0328	Two Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 0633 hours.
	1005	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1008 hours.
16 October 2011	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Beirut, Jubayl and the Bekaa before leaving at 1615 hours over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1610 hours over Naqurah.
	1335	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1335 hours.
	1654	An Israeli enemy aircraft violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1701 hours.
	1800	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1810 hours.
17 October 2011	1850	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, circling over Bint Jubayl before leaving at 1910 hours.
	1925	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, circling over Bint Jubayl before leaving at 1930 hours.
	1950	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, circling over Bint Jubayl before leaving at 2015 hours.
18 October 2011	1920	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1945 hours.
19 October 2011	1400	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving over Rumaysh at 0015 hours on 20 October 2011.
20 October 2011	0705	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1910 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0712	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1225 hours over Rumaysh.
	1410	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1420 hours.
	1930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. It circled over the sea between Tyre and Sidon before leaving at 2115 over the sea off Naqurah.
	2235	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled between the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving over Kafr Killa at 0740 hours on 21 October 2011.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
21 October 2011	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1730 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1440 hours over Naqurah.
	1045	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving over Rumaysh at 0045 hours on 22 October 2011.
	1250	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Jubayl and flying east. They left at 1300 hours over the sea off Tripoli.
	1300	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1340 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1325	From an aircraft flying at high altitude over the Mukallis area, the Israeli enemy dropped a suspicious object which was attached to a parachute.
22 October 2011	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1810 hours over Rumaysh.
	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1930 hours over Rumaysh.
23 October 2011	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1535 hours over Aytarun.
	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving over Naqurah at 1825 hours.
	1135	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1250 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1345	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1825 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1825	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 2305 hours over Naqurah.
	2210	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving over Naqurah at 0520 hours on 24 October 2011.
	2311	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 2327 hours.
24 October 2011	0550	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1050 hours over Naqurah.
	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1235 hours over Naqurah.
	1335	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Al-Arz (the Cedars), Shikka and the South before leaving over Rumaysh at 0520 hours on 25 October 2011.
	1925	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 1935 hours.
	2020	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the South before leaving at 2025 hours.
25 October 2011	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1810 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1835 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving over Naqurah at 0300 hours on 26 October 2011.
	1350	An Israeli enemy warplane violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1400 hours.
26 October 2011	1600	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1800 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
27 October 2011	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and Beirut before leaving over Rumaysh at 0615 hours on 28 October 2011.
	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2140 hours over Aytarun.
28 October 2011	0100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1045 hours over Naqurah.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the Shab'a Farms. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1345 hours over Rumaysh.
	1155	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, circling over the South before leaving at 1412 hours.
31 October 2011	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1700 hours over Naqurah.
	1815	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving over Naqurah at 0445 hours on 1 November 2011.

United Nations S/2011/777

Security Council

Distr.: General
21 December 2011

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the representatives and deputies and alternate representatives of the members of the Security Council elected for the period 2012-2013

1. At its 37th plenary meeting, on 21 October 2011, the General Assembly elected Guatemala, Morocco, Pakistan and Togo as non-permanent members of the Security Council for a term of two years beginning on 1 January 2012. At its 40th plenary meeting, on 24 October, the Assembly elected Azerbaijan as a non-permanent member of the Council, also for a term of two years beginning on 1 January 2012.

2. Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that, with regard to the representation of the members of the Council elected for the period 2012-2013, he has received the communications referred to hereinunder.

Azerbaijan: Credentials from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, signed on 16 December 2011, stating that Mr. Agshin Mehdiyev has been appointed representative of Azerbaijan on the Security Council, Mr. Tofig Musayev, deputy representative, and Mr. Yusuf Mammadaliyev, Mr. Samir Sharifov, Mr. Elchin Huseynli, Mrs. Esmira Jafarova, Mr. Habib Mikayilli and Mr. Farid Jafarov, alternate representatives.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

Guatemala: Credentials from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guatemala, signed on 2 November 2011, stating that Mr. Gert Rosenthal has been appointed representative of Guatemala on the Security Council, Mr. José Alberto Briz Gutiérrez, deputy representative, and Ms. Connie Taracena Secaira, Mr. Omar Castañeda Solares, Ms. Mónica Bolaños-Pérez and Ms. Ana Cristina Rodriguez-Pineda, alternate representatives.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

Morocco: Credentials from the Minister for External Affairs of Morocco, signed on 16 November 2011, stating that Mr. Mohammed Loulichki has been appointed representative of Morocco on the Security Council, Mr. Lotfi Bouchaara, deputy representative, and Mr. Bouchaib Eloumni, Mr. Ismail Chekkori, Mr. Hassan El Mkhantar, Mr. Omar Kadiri, Mr. Faiçal Souissi, Mr. Tarik Iziraren, Mr. Amine Chabi, Ms. Lalla Soumia Bouhamidi, Mr. Omar El Khadir, Mr. Aziz El Haouari, Mrs. Bouteina Chraibi, Mr. Brahim Benmoussa, Mr. Isam Taib and Mrs. Jamila Alaoui, alternate representatives.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

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Pakistan: Credentials from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, signed on 14 December 2011, stating that Mr. Abdullah Hussain Haroon has been appointed representative of Pakistan on the Security Council, Mr. Raza Bashir Tarar, deputy representative, and Mr. Ahmad Naseem Warraich, Mr. Marghoob Saleem Butt, Mr. Farrukh Iqbal Khan, Mr. Abdul Hameed, Mr. Suljuk Mustansar Tarar, Mr. Tahir Hussain Andrabi, Mr. Ahmad Farooq and Mr. Umer Siddique, alternate representatives.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

Togo: Credentials from the President of Togo, signed on 17 December 2011, stating that Mr. Kodjo Menan has been appointed representative of Togo on the Security Council, Mr. Limbiyè Bariki, deputy representative, and Mr. Kokou Nayo Mbeou, Mr. Yakoley Johnson, Mr. Koffi Kumélio Afande, Mr. Fademba Madakome Waguena, Mrs. Kouméalo Balli, Mr. Kokou Tchodie, Mr. Mama Raouf Tchagnao, Mr. Waké Yagninim, Mr. Ousmane Afo Salifou, Mr. Amévi Akpoto Komlagan, Mr. Kokouda Bocco and Mr. Tmanawê Tazo, alternate representatives.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

United Nations A/66/618–S/2011/778

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
19 December 2011

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-sixth session
Agenda item 35
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 16 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia dated 14 December 2011, on the eighteenth round of the Geneva international discussions, held on 14 December 2011 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alexander **Lomaia**
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 16 December 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the eighteenth round of the Geneva international discussions

At the eighteenth round of the Geneva international discussions, held on 14 December 2011, the issues of security and stability in Georgia's occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions and the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to the places of their original residence were discussed. At the meetings of the two working groups held on 14 December, participants took part in an individual capacity. Discussions were moderated by the representatives of the United Nations, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and attended by the participants from Georgia, the Russian Federation and the United States of America. The Head of the Provisional Administration of the former South Ossetian Autonomous District, Dimitri Sanakoev, and the Chairman of the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, Giorgi Baramia, took part in the eighteenth round of the discussions. Representatives of the proxy regimes from Tskhinvali and Sokhumi also participated in the working groups. The delegation from Georgia was headed by the Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergi Kapanadze.

During the eighteenth round of the discussions, the Georgian side expressed its appreciation for the efforts of the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for Protracted Conflicts, Giedrius Čekuolis, and welcomed the 2012 Irish OSCE Chairmanship's Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the new Co-Chair of the Geneva discussions, Pádraig Murphy.

Within the first working group of the Geneva discussions, which focuses on the ways to reach an agreement on the non-use of force and the international security arrangements, concrete steps from the plan proposed by the co-chairs were discussed. It was emphasized that security and stability will be established only after the Russian Federation undertakes the commitment not to use force against Georgia and fully implements all provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement of 12 August, including the withdrawal of the military forces from Georgia's occupied regions. The co-chairs of the Geneva discussions, as well as the representatives of the United States once again reiterated their call on the Russian Federation to pledge the non-use of force towards Georgia. The necessity of such commitments from the Russian side is extremely important in the context of continuous militarization of Georgia's occupied territories and against the background of the intensification of aggressive rhetoric from various Russian officials. In this context, particular attention was drawn to the recent provocative statements from Mr. Patrushev and Mr. Lavrov. The Georgian side remains hopeful that the Russian Federation will reciprocate the unilateral pledge by Tbilisi on the non-use of force made in November 2010 and will undertake the commitment not to use force against Georgia. Work will continue in this respect during the upcoming rounds of the Geneva talks.

The Georgian side once again requested to discuss seriously the establishment of international security arrangements inside the occupied regions. It was stressed by many participants that the international security arrangements represent the best guarantee for peace and the non-resumption of hostilities. The co-chairs once again urged the participants to discuss in good faith the issue of an international presence within the occupied territories, and to enable the European Union Monitoring Mission to fully implement its mandate and guarantee unhindered humanitarian access to the regions. Concrete steps have been proposed in this regard, which will continue to be reviewed during the forthcoming rounds.

During the eighteenth round, the Georgian side once again brought to the attention of the co-chairs the cases of the violations of freedom of movement in the vicinity of the occupied territories and expressed its concern regarding the continuous practice of arbitrary detentions of the local population by the Russian Federal Security Service border guards and the proxy regimes. Once again, the co-chairs have issued a strong call for all participants to refrain from such practices and to release the detained persons.

Participants stressed the continuous good work of the Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) and expressed readiness to continue addressing the issues affecting the security of the populations on the ground in good faith. Several participants underlined the necessity of full utilization of the potential of IPRMs.

Within the second working group, unfortunately, Moscow and its proxy regimes still refuse to discuss humanitarian issues related to the safe, dignified and voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to the places of their original residence. It is absolutely necessary to uphold the internationally recognized right of IDPs and refugees to return to their homes, and the Georgian side remains hopeful that next rounds will demonstrate progress in this regard.

The nineteenth round of the Geneva international discussions will take place on 29 March 2012.

Tbilisi, 14 December 2011

United Nations S/2011/779

Security Council

Distr.: General
21 December 2011

Original: English

Russian Federation and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Noting with concern that the situation in the Middle East is tense and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force of 30 November 2011 (S/2011/748), and also reaffirming its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,

Expressing grave concern at the serious events that occurred in UNDOF's area of operations on 15 May and 5 June that put the long-held ceasefire in jeopardy,

Noting that evolving conditions in the region could have an impact on the functioning of the Force,

1. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;

2. *Calls on* all parties to cooperate fully with the operations of UNDOF and to ensure the security of as well as unhindered and immediate access for the United Nations personnel carrying out their mandate, in conformity with existing agreements;

3. *Recalls* the obligation on both parties to fully respect the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, and *calls on* the parties to exercise maximum restraint and prevent any breaches of the ceasefire and the area of separation;

4. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

5. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's assessment of the operational capacity of UNDOF and *requests* that he take steps to immediately implement the recommendations as outlined in paragraph 12 of S/2011/748;

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6. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for a period of six months, that is, until 30 June 2012;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit, at the end of this period, a report on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).

United Nations A/66/620–S/2011/780

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
19 December 2011

Original: English

General Assembly
Agenda item 127
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 16 December 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you the attached letter dated 26 November 2011 that I have received from Judge Khalida Rachid Khan, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (see annex).

In her letter, Judge Khan requests the extension of the term of office of four permanent judges and seven ad litem judges of the Trial Chamber until 30 June 2012 or until the completion of the cases to which they are assigned, if sooner. I recall that, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1932 (2010) and General Assembly decision 64/415, the current term of office of the Trial Chamber judges is set to expire on 31 December 2011. However, contrary to previous projections, several cases will not be completed by the end of 2011. It is therefore necessary to extend the term of office of the judges to enable them to complete the cases.

It falls to the General Assembly and the Security Council to consider and decide on these requests. Accordingly, I would be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

Annex

Letter dated 26 November 2011 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to request the extension of the terms of office for a number of the Tribunal's judges. In connection with this, I am also submitting an updated trial schedule (enclosure 1) and an overview of the current assignments of all trial judges serving at the Tribunal (enclosure 2). I ask that you submit this request to the Security Council and the General Assembly for appropriate action, where required.

During the course of 2011, so far one permanent and two ad litem judges have completed their service to the Tribunal and demitted office and two further ad litem judges will demit office on 31 December 2011. Judges de Silva and Hikmet left in May 2011, Judge Short departed in October 2011, and Judges Arrey and Akay will leave the Tribunal upon completion of their cases in December 2011.

Based on the current trial schedule attached, I seek extension of the terms of office for our four remaining permanent trial judges and for seven of our nine ad litem judges. The extension request takes into consideration that three of our permanent judges will be redeployed to the Appeals Chamber in line with Article 13 (3) of the Statute.

I must note that there will be a need to seek further extensions should the referral of the *Uwinkindi* case to Rwanda be reversed on appeal.

Below, I have discussed each judicial activity that will require extensions into 2012. I have asked for extensions for all judges until 30 June 2012, or upon completion of the cases to which they are or will be assigned, if sooner. As you will note, some judges will complete their work in the first quarter of 2012. I have asked for an overall extension until June 2012 as circumstances frequently arise that require short-term extensions as well as completion of cases which cannot yet be firmly scheduled.

Trials

Karemera et al. (Judges Byron, Kam and Joensen)

The *Karemera et al.* judgement will be delivered as anticipated on 21 December 2011. However, it is expected that a short period will be needed after oral delivery to finalize the very complex written judgement. The finalization of the judgement has been delayed by disclosure of possible exculpatory material in October 2011. Even with the time to finalize the written judgement, this will be by far the shortest time needed between the close of evidence and delivery of judgement in any multi-accused case in the history of the Tribunal.

Nizeyimana (Judges Muthoga, Park and Fremr)

The *Nizeyimana* judgement will be delivered in March 2012, which has been the date anticipated in the last two completion strategy reports.

Nzabonimana (Judges Bossa, Tuzmukhamedov and Rajohnson)

Judgement delivery is now expected in March 2012 instead of December 2011, due to the procedural complexity of the case, the reopening of the evidence phase to hear further Defence evidence, and the judges' intensive final work in other cases. I had informed the Security Council of this delay in my letter of 26 September 2011 to the Secretary-General requesting Judge Tuzmukhamedov's temporary part-time assignment. I also discussed this in my address presenting the annual report to the General Assembly on 11 November 2011.

Ngirabatware (Judges Sekule, Bossa and Rajohnson)

The *Ngirabatware* judgement is now scheduled to be delivered in June 2012 rather than March 2012. This is due in part to the unanticipated length of the Defence case, which has been extended due to fair trial requirements, as well as to the involvement of the judges in other trials. I also noted this delay in my speech to the General Assembly on 11 November 2011.

Other judicial activities

- *Munyagishari*: Pre-trial and rule 11 bis referral application (Judges Khan, Muthoga and Park). The Prosecution filed a rule 11 bis motion for referral of the case to Rwanda on 3 October 2011. A decision on this is expected in early 2012 after the decision is rendered on the appeal of the *Uwinkindi* referral.
- *Sikubwabo* and *Kayishema*: Rule 11 bis referral application (Judges Khan, Joensen and Kam). A decision on this is expected in early 2012 after the decision is rendered on the appeal of the *Uwinkindi* referral.
- Lifting of over 500 witness protection orders (thus far, Judge Joensen). Work has begun on the lifting of hundreds of witness protection orders so that the Residual Mechanism will not be burdened with the resource demanding management of witnesses whose protection is no longer required.
- Three anticipated contempt cases will be assigned benches upon arrest of the fugitive accused, and are expected to require judges until 30 June 2012.

Permanent judges

All remaining permanent trial judges, except for Judge Byron, are to be redeployed to the Appeals Chamber upon completion of their work, at which time their terms of office will be the same as the terms of office of other Appeals Chamber judges, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1878 (2009). Until then, extension is sought in line with the current anticipated completion of their work in Arusha.

Extensions are sought until 30 June 2012 or completion of the cases to which they are or will be assigned, if sooner, for the following:

Judge Khalida Rachid Khan (Pakistan)
Judge William H. Sekule (United Republic of Tanzania)
Judge Charles Michael Dennis Byron (Saint Kitts and Nevis)
Judge Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov (Russian Federation)

Ad litem judges

All ad litem judges are expected to demit office at the completion of their current judicial activities.

Extensions are sought until 30 June 2012 or completion of the cases to which they are or will be assigned, if sooner, for:

Judge Vagn Joensen (Denmark)
Judge Solomy Balungi Bossa (Uganda)
Judge Lee Gacuiga Muthoga (Kenya)
Judge Seon Ki Park (Republic of Korea)
Judge Gberdao Gustave Kam (Burkina Faso)
Judge Robert Fremr (Czech Republic)
Judge Mparany Rajohnson (Madagascar)

These matters are of crucial importance to ensure that the Tribunal can meet the goals of its completion strategy, that is, the completion of all trials by the first half of 2012 and of all appeals by the end of 2014.

I would therefore be grateful if you would bring this request to the attention of the Security Council and the General Assembly for necessary action, where required.

(*Signed*) Khalida Rachid **Khan**
President

Enclosure 1

Projected schedule of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as of 26 November 2011[a]


2010
2011
2012
Residual Mechanism
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Karemera et al.
Judges Byron, Kam, Joensen
Nzabonimana
Judges Bossa, Tuzmukhamedov, Rajohnson
Nizeyimana
Judges Muthoga, Park, Fremr
Ngirabatware
Judges Sekule, Bossa, Rajohnson
Key:
Pre-trial
Trial

Other work

Reviewing approximately 500 witness protection orders

Review of six amended indictments with respect to fugitives

Decisions in at least two further rule 11 bis applications

Three expected contempt cases

Kabuga, Mpiranya and Bizimana rule 71 bis preservation of evidence proceedings

Rules Committee final review of draft rules of procedure and evidence of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

[a] Dates are indicated for oral delivery of judgements. Additional time is sometimes required to finalize complex written judgements.

Enclosure 2

Current assignments of the trial judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and expected completion dates as of 26 November 2011

Permanent judges

Judge	*Assigned case*	*Projected completion date*[a,b]
Khan (Pakistan)	*Sikubwabo* rule 11 bis and *Kayishema* rule 11 bis (Presiding)	To be announced
	Munyagishari pre-trial (Presiding)	To be announced
	Munyagishari rule 11 bis (Presiding)	To be announced
Sekule (United Republic of Tanzania)	*Ngirabatware* (Presiding)	June 2012
Byron (Saint Kitts)	*Karemera et al.* (Presiding)	December 2011
	Uwinkindi pre-trial (Presiding)	To be announced
Tuzmukhamedov (Russian Federation)	*Ndahimana*	November 2011
	Nzabonimana	March 2012

Ad Litem Judges

Joensen (Denmark)	*Karemera et al.*	December 2011
	Uwinkindi pre-trial	To be announced
	Kabuga rule 71 bis	March 2012
	Sikubwabo rule 11 bis and *Kayishema* rule 11 bis	To be announced
Bossa (Uganda)	*Ngirabatware*	June 2012
	Nzabonimana (Presiding)	March 2012
Muthoga (Kenya)	*Nizeyimana* (Presiding)	March 2012
	Munyagishari pre-trial	To be announced
	Munyagishari rule 11 bis	To be announced
Arrey (Cameroon)	*Ndahimana* (Presiding)	November 2011
	Mpiranya rule 71 bis	December 2011
Park (Republic of Korea)	*Nizeyimana*	March 2012
	Munyagishari pre-trial	To be announced

Judge	*Assigned case*	*Projected completion date*[a,b]
	Munyagishari rule 11 bis	To be announced
Kam (Burkina Faso)	*Karemera et al.*	December 2011
	Bizimana rule 71 bis	December 2011
	Sikubwabo rule 11 bis and *Kayishema* rule 11 bis	To be announced
	Uwinkindi pre-trial	To be announced
Fremr (Czech Republic)	*Nizeyimana*	March 2012
Rajohnson (Madagascar)	*Ngirabatware*	June 2012
	Nzabonimana	March 2012
	Ndahimana	November 2011
Akay (Turkey)	*Ndahimana*	November 2011

[a] All completion dates to be announced will be determined after the Appeals Chamber renders the *Uwinkindi* decision.
[b] Where judgement delivery dates are discussed, the dates indicated are for oral delivery. Additional time is sometimes required to finalize complex written judgements.

Additional assignments required for

- **Three expected contempt cases**
- **Lifting of over 500 witness protection orders**
- **Review of six amended indictments with respect to fugitives.**

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Agenda item 127
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 20 December 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you the attached letter dated 13 December 2011 from Judge Khalida Rachid Khan, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (see annex).

In her letter, Judge Khan requests the extension of the term of office of Judge Florence Rita Arrey, an ad litem judge of the Trial Chamber of the Tribunal, until 30 June 2012 or until the completion of the cases to which she is assigned, if sooner. I recall that, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1932 (2010) and General Assembly decision 64/415, the current term of office of the Trial Chamber judges is set to expire on 31 December 2011. However, Judge Arrey is required to complete a dissenting opinion in the *Ndahimana* case, to decide on a motion for the preservation of defence evidence in the *Mpiranya* case and, if the motion is granted, to preside over the evidence preservation proceedings. An extension of her term of office is necessary because it is projected that this work will be completed in the first quarter of 2012.

It falls to the General Assembly and the Security Council to consider and decide on these requests. Accordingly, I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

Annex

Letter dated 13 December 2011 from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing in reference to my letter dated 26 November 2011 (A/66/620-S/2011/780) to supplement my request for the extension of the terms of office for a number of the Tribunal's judges. Since my letter of 26 November 2011, there have been some developments that have caused the necessity to request the extension of one additional ad litem judge who was previously expected to demit office on 31 December 2011.

Judge Florence Rita Arrey is the Presiding Judge on the *Ndahimana* case, for which the oral judgement summary was delivered on 17 November 2011. Judge Arrey has informed me that, due to the complex dissent that she is writing in that case, which deals with many of the most fundamental aspects of the judgement, she will need to address the reasons given in the majority opinion which has not yet been finalized. Therefore, she will need a short time beyond 31 December to finish drafting her written dissent.

In addition, yesterday I received a motion from duty counsel for the defence in the *Mpiranya* proceedings for the preservation of evidence under rule 71 bis seeking to call witnesses in order to preserve defence evidence. The single judge presiding over the Prosecution's evidence preservation in *Mpiranya* was Judge Arrey. I have previously considered that the single judge who presided over the Prosecution's preservation of evidence in a particular case was best placed to decide to what extent it is necessary to grant the defence motion to rebut the prosecution evidence that has been preserved by calling further witnesses. Moreover, that Judge would also be best placed to preside over the proceedings to preserve defence evidence. The preservation of defence evidence, if granted in the *Mpiranya* case, would be expected to be completed in the first quarter of 2012.

Therefore, extension is sought until 30 June 2012 or completion of the cases to which she is or will be assigned, if sooner, for Judge Florence Rita Arrey (Cameroon).

This matter is of crucial importance to ensure that the integrity of the *Ndahimana* judgement remains intact, as well as to ensure that the *Mpiranya* rule 71 bis proceedings are conducted in a fair and expeditious manner.

I would be grateful if you could bring my request to the attention of the Security Council and the General Assembly for necessary action, as required.

(*Signed*) Khalida Rachid **Khan**
President